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Multi-Culturalism Redux:
Science, Law, and Politics
Peter H. Schuckt
The very word justice irritates scientists. No surgeon expects to be asked
if an operation for cancer is just or not. No doctor will be reproached
on the grounds that the dose of penicillin he has prescribed is less or
more than justice would stipulate.'
A third of a century has now passed since the British writer C.P. Snow
sounded an alarm about the "two cultures" problem.2 By "culture," he meant
both a course of intellectual development and "a group of persons living in the
same environment, linked by common habits, common assumptions, a common
way of life" 3-definitions that will adequately serve my purposes here. Snow
wrote of the "gulf of mutual incomprehension" yawning between the cultures
of science and of literature, which he called "traditional" culture. Literary
intellectuals' misunderstanding of science, he noted, often verged on "hostility
and dislike. "'
With the clairvoyance of hindsight, we can now see that Snow aimed at
the wrong target.' Misunderstandings between science and literature today are
t Simeon E. Baldwin Professor, Yale Law School. Shorter versions of this paper were delivered as
the Nordlander Lecture in Science and Public Policy at Cornell University on November 19, 1992, and
as the "I Lunedi Dell'Associazone" lecture at the Scuola Superiore di Studi Universitari e di Perfezion-
amento S. Anna on May 3, 1993. Bruce Ackerman, E. Donald Elliott, Michael Green, Jay Katz, David
Kaye, and Joseph Sanders commented on earlier drafts. I also benefited from a discussion of the subject
with Drs. Leonard Milstone and Jonathan Katz, and with the graduate students in Cornell's Department
of Science and Technology Studies. Comments received at a faculty workshop at the University of Michigan
Law School on March 26, 1993 were also helpful, especially those by Richard Friedman. Tiffany West
provided research assistance.
1. KARL MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT 17 (1968).
2. C.P. SNOW, THE Two CULTURES (1965). For a legal scholar's ruminations about a two cultures
problem within legal education, see Harry Wellington, Challenges to Legal Education: The 7vo Cultures'
Phenomenon, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 327 (1987).
3. Id. at 62-64.
4. Id. at 4.
5. Snow's generally elegant, insightful essay also fails on other grounds. For example, he never
satisfactorily explained why the misunderstanding between science and literature was problematic enough
to justify his small book, not to mention the much larger commentary that immediately followed in its wake.
The flood of responses provoked by his book made him feel (as he later recalled) "uncomfortably like the
sorcerer's apprentice." Id. at 54. From the controversy stirred by his lecture, he inferred that his ideas
on the subject "were not at all original but were waiting in the air." Id. at 54-55.
He also failed to specify the links between intellectuals' attitudes toward science and politicians'
willingness to support it. Thus, Snow failed to lay a foundation for his conviction that the anti-scientific
attitudes emerging among intellectuals threatened science's political support and thus its capacity to improve
the conditions of life. Id. at 90-97. Moreover, the course of history has proved his prediction proved quite
wrong, as the enormous growth since the 1950s in the NIH, NSF, and NASA budgets attest. Of course
it is possible that even more resources would have been forthcoming, absent the antipathy that he described.
Nor did Snow identify the causes of the science-literature schism. He did observe that scientists were
more optimistic; they distinguished, as the traditionalists did not, between the tragedy of the human
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rather a sideshow, peripheral to the main event. Science's clashes with two6
other cultures, law and politics, seem far more consequential given the speed
of technological change, the growth of the administrative state's authority to
control it, and the coercive power of legal and political authority.7
One is tempted to draw an analogy between this cultural conflict and the
bitter religious and ethnic struggles that roil most countries and many Ameri-
can cities today. Like these other struggles, the science-law-politics conflict
is fundamentally cultural; the ultimate prize is the power to shape how society
thinks, feels, lives, values, and chooses. Like religio-ethnic confrontations, this
conflict unfolds simultaneously at various levels: in obscurity (individual
scientific research, legal argument, policy analysis) and in the glare of public
view (NIH budget debates, Supreme Court decisions, regulatory legislation).
And like them, the conflict-even when it goes unrecognized-lies near the
center of our most important public debates.
The analogy to religious and ethnic struggles, of course, can only take us
so far. Unlike the combatants in Bosnia, the Punjab, and South Central Los
Angeles, the partisans of science, law, and politics generally recognize that
their professional cultures are neither monolithic nor wholly self-defining, and
that their social interdependence runs deep. They bear a common allegiance
to the democratic institutions charged with regulating multi-cultural conflicts.
They do not dispute their competitors' legitimacy within the proper spheres
of each. While their cultural chauvinism is often vehement, it is not violent-
except rhetorically. Finally, precisely because these battles usually occur within
a legislative chamber or courtroom over a discrete, often narrowly technical
policy issue, the combatants can more easily forget that something much
greater-a normative world-view-is actually at stake.
This article has three parts. Part I sets the stage for my analysis of this
multi-cultural conflict. There I describe two notorious disputes, Bendectin and
Agent Orange, which exemplify some of the patterns that I shall discuss.
condition and the melioristic potential of social action. Id. at 6-7. But instead of asking why this difference
had arisen, he contented himself with suggesting that scientists' greater commitment to problem-solving
had something to do with it. Id. at 7.
6. It hardly need be said that my choice of three cultures is somewhat arbitrary. If greater analytical
precision were the goal, one could easily multiply the number. Indeed, as I shall discuss, each of the three
contains important subcultures. For example, Snow and many others have distinguished between pure and
applied science. Id. at 31. I note some other distinctions. See infra text accompanying note 45. Professor
Jasanoff has extended this distinction to that between research and regulatory science. SHEILA JASANOFF,
THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS AS POLICYMAKERS 6 (1990).
Snow noted that his two cultures could as easily have been 102 or 2002. SNOW, supra note 2, at 9,
66. Similarly, my three cultures could be subdivided or increased with little difficulty. A more rigorous
or taxonomic purpose would require more refined distinctions. For present purposes, however, taxonomic
precision is less important than broad thematic coherence, which a proliferation of categories might
diminish.
7. As to relative consequentiality, my colleague Owen Fiss has made a similar point about the effects
of applying literary theory to the interpretation of legal texts. Owen M. Fiss, Objectivityand Interpretation,
34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982).
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Part II extends the theme of cultural conflict beyond the litigation context
by sequentially analyzing and comparing science, law, and politics along three
dimensions: their central values; their distinctive incentive structures and
decision techniques; and their characteristic biases, especially their orientations
toward the tension between professional and populist values.
In Part III, I consider how we should approach the multi-culturalism
problem in public policymaking, especially where science issues are involved.
After noting that these conflicts are not only inevitable but socially desirable
in a democratic-liberal-technocratic polity,8 I advocate a criterion of cultural
competence for allocating decisional authority over multi-cultural issues. I
suggest that by empowering one culture's distinctive decision-making rules and
institutions to control the issues lying at that culture's core, the relevant
scientific, legal, and political values can be integrated with greater synergy and
less waste. I conclude by exploring some specific reform implications of the
analysis, including the creation of new inter-cultural "bridging" institutions.
Before turning to the cases, some preliminary observations about the
discussion that follows are in order. First, I treat multi-culturalism generally
and more specifically in terms of the character of the three cultures, and the
relations among them. I am primarily interested, however, in the relationship
between science and law, a priority reflected in the discussion in Parts I and
III. My reasons are fairly straightforward. Politics-law and politics-science
conflicts are ubiquitous and are resolved through the fluid, workaday processes
of political give-and-take. Subject to constitutional limits, politicians hold the
trump cards and can impose whatever solutions they like. In a crucial sense,
politics is a meta-culture, regulating other cultures and their interactions.
Politicians' collisions with law and with science are therefore ubiquitous and
receive constant attention and sophisticated commentary. In both Agent Orange
(and to a lesser extent, Bendectin), for example, politics was the forum to
which those dissatisfied with the law's handling of scientific issues could and
did ultimately appeal. Conflicts between science and law, moreover, are more
obscure and less visible to the public eye. These cultures are more technical
and less open-textured than politics; hence their own internal structures and
requirements, which are poorly understood by outsiders, constrain the solutions
to their conflicts, which become matters primarily for insiders. Thus, public
discourse about them is relatively parochial and impoverished.
Second, although the law intersects with scientific and technical analysis
at almost every turn,9 I am primarily interested in two other legal domains
8. Democratic, liberal, and technocratic values, of course, can and often do clash with each other.
For one exploration of these value clashes (analyzed under other labels), see JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAU-
CRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMs (1983).
9. For example, the law of intellectual property, especially patents, takes its very content from science,
both pure and applied. The law of evidence often demands scientific support for the use of certain
techniques, such as DNA typing and epidemiology, and for the drawing of particular inferences from
3
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in which science plays an especially prominent role. The first is the public law
of "social regulation"-environmental protection, occupational safety and
health law, consumer product safety, and the like-in which government
agencies develop and enforce general legal standards in order to promote
public health. This domain is exemplified by the Bendectin litigation. The
second is the private law of toxic torts in which individuals sue alleged
polluters and product distributors for compensation for harm, usually personal
injuries.10 Here, I offer the Agent Orange case as the example. In both
domains, advocates and decision-makers must mobilize and interpret uncertain
scientific data in support of legal arguments and authoritative decisions about
risk assessment and risk distribution in society. I focus on social regulation and
toxic torts because the differences among science, law, and politics are most
profound, controversial, and problematic in these areas.
Third, I shall emphasize cultural conflict. By doing so, I do not mean to
deny that these three cultures exhibit some important commonalities."t For
example, each culture is centrally concerned with solving problems, though,
of course, not of the same kind or in the same way. Each culture is also highly
professionalized; in order to join and succeed, its members must acquire'an
arcane knowledge, practice special techniques and skills, and subscribe to a
distinctive set of norms, a world view common to the group. Each culture
seeks to enhance the group's social power, its command of resources and
values. Finally, each culture is supported by and indispensable to the modern
state's effectiveness.
Still, the cultures' divergences are more striking than their commonalities.
Science, law, and politics are not merely unique ways of living and thinking
but also represent radically different modes of legitimating public decisions.
Each invokes distinct values in support of its claims to exercise authority.
Science appeals to the capacity of technical rationality and specialized expertise
to generate and test empirically falsifiable propositions.12 Law appeals to the
testimony, such as causation. Medical malpractice cases usually involve (indeed, they may require)
testimony by scientific experts. Antitrust litigation relies heavily upon technical economic analysis of
product markets. Employment discrimination law often looks to statistical analyses of labor markets for
evidence of bias.
10. For an extensive but (in the author's words) selective bibliography on toxic torts, see Robert F.
Blomquist, An Introduction to American Toxic Tort Law: Three Overarching Metaphors and Three Sources
of Law, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 795, 802-05 n.29 (1992).
11. The relationship between law and politics is especially close. Indeed, many would say-some have
said-that law and politics are essentially indistinguishable. See, e.g., David Kairys, Legal Reasoning, in
THE POLITICS OF LAW 11, 17 (David Kairys ed., 1982) (asserting that "law is simply politics by other
means"). I do not agree with Kairys' use of the word "simply".
12. See generally KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 32-33 (1961) (emphasizing
testability and falsifiability criteria); THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d
ed. 1970) (discussing the testing of paradigms).
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capacity of universal, abstract, binding principles to produce justice." Demo-
cratic politics appeals to the capacity of participation, accommodation, and
accountability to justify the state's coercive authority. 4 Each, then, invokes
a distinctive conception of truth or, less grandly, of how tc achieve the good.
The three cultures, then, compete at several different levels. 5 They are
encoded in diverse public symbols, appeal to discrete conceptions of decisional
legitimacy, express their own rhetoric, and develop their own power bases.
And because each culture is embedded in different governmental institutions,
each must face special structural and constitutional obstacles to resolving multi-
cultural tensions.1 6 This cultural competition is socially desirable in many
ways, but unless it is creatively managed-the subject of Part HI-it may also
occasion great social cost.
The Bendectin and Agent Orange litigations with which I begin are hardly
typical cases, but neither are they anomalous or anachronistic. They exhibit
some of the deep normative and political conflicts that divide the scientific,
legal, and political cultures. Such conflicts are certain to intensify in the future.
Science's remarkable advances in instrumentation, methodology, theory, and
data constantly generate new ethical and regulatory dilemmas which only a
combination of law and politics can resolve. It unleashes a cascade of new
products and new technologies which create new risks that often justify social
control. 7 Science's growing capacity to postpone death, for example, raises
the most delicate questions about the quality and cost of life, while its emerg-
ing genetic wizardry engenders new value conflicts and Faustian bargains. 8
13. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW
(1961); IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT: IMMANUEL KANT's MORAL AND POLITICAL
WRITINGS (Carl J. Friedrich ed. & Theodore M. Greene et al. trans., 1949).
14. ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956).
15. Snow was not evenhanded in appraising the scientific and traditional cultures. To be sure, he
maintained that each was impoverished in its own way; scientists possessed under-developed imaginative
faculties, while literary intellectuals were blind to the beauty and utility of the natural order. Nevertheless,
no reader of The Two Cultures can doubt which of them he thought the more benighted and taxable with
the heavy burdens of change. Whereas literary intellectuals were "natural Luddites," scientists were by
nature progressive, leading society toward a luminous future. SNOW, supra note 2, at 22.
Snow's harsh indictment of traditional culture was misguided, I think, in its failure to recognize how
that culture was essential to the social legitimacy and power of science. It was the traditional culture, after
all, that succeeded in first exposing and then softening the harsh rigors of the Industrial Revolution. To
see that this is so, one need only consider how traditionalist writers like Blake, Dickens, Disraeli, the early
Marx, Whitman, and Upton Sinclair influenced reform in Britain and the U.S. These humanists, Luddites
or not, helped to palliate and domesticate the profound technological and social changes that industrialism
had wrought. By doing so, they rendered these changes more acceptable to the public.
16. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 131-133.
17. As Peter Huber has argued, the fact that the risks are new does not mean that they are greater
than those which they may have displaced. Peter Huber, The Old-New Division in Risk Regulation, 69 VA.
L. REV. 1025 (1983).
18. See, e.g., LEON R. KASS, TOWARD A MORE NATURAL SCIENCE: BIOLOGY AND HUMAN AFFAIRS
(1985); see also JUDITH AREEN ET AL., LAW, SCIENCE AND MEDICINE ch. 7 (Death and Dying), ch. 8
(Reproduction and the New Genetics) (1984); Gina Kolata, Ethicists Struggle to Judge the 'Value of Life",
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1992, at C3; Norman Frost, Regulating Genetic Technology: Values in Conflict,
in 3 GENETICS AND THE LAW (Aubrey Milunsky & George J. Annas eds., 1985).
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Law and politics, for their parts, are chronically ambitious, constantly
striving to extend their jurisdictions to regulate scientific activities that were
previously autonomous. This ambition is fortified by changing social attitudes
about risk and expertise that weaken public deference to science. Recent
disputes over products and technologies-asbestos, breast implants, video
terminal displays, computer keyboards, cigarettes, electromagnetic fields, and
many others-prefigure further political and legal growth. They presage a
future of constant cultural collisions, pressures for regulatory controls, and
novel personal injury litigation.
In order to explain the problematic handling of disputes like Bendectin and
Agent Orange, it arguably is not necessary to resort to the somewhat elusive
notion of cultural conflict at all. In this view, a simpler, more parsimonious
explanation would be that the law is just not very competent in resolving
complex scientific disputes very well. This explanation, however, would
merely raise a more basic question: why are legal rules and institutions still
applied to such disputes when they have proved to be problematic in resolving
them? The answer to this question, I believe, begins with the notion that the
law approaches this adjudicative task in a culturally bound, hence normatively
loaded, way, which confirms the law in viewing it simply as an old task arising
in a new context. The law uses traditional methods not because it is mindless
or hidebound but because these methods encode its most cherished, distinctive
values.
The notions of culture and cultural conflict are certainly not the only, and
may not even be the best, concepts for understanding the problematic outcomes
that one increasingly observes at the intersection of law, science, and politics.
Culture is a notoriously slippery concept, as the bitter controversy among
social scientists over the existence of a "culture of poverty" reveals. As I have
just suggested, however, the idea of law's incompetence in dealing with
science is even more question-begging. In attempting to understand both the
law's stubborn insistence on doing new things in the old ways and its continu-
ing difficulty in comprehending and integrating the quite different modes of
science and of politics, the idea of culture-of a unique way of viewing,
valuing, and manipulating the world-seems as serviceable as any.
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I. Two CASE STUDIES
Fortunately for our purposes, the twists and turns of the Bendectin and
Agent Orange litigations have been comprehensively documented. They
continue today, fifteen years after the first cases in each litigation were
filed. 9 In each case, science, law, and (to a lesser extent) politics were
obliged to enter into a kind of shotgun marriage. In each, this awkward union
was consummated not in nuptial bliss but in a bitter estrangement, as the
unwilling partners pursued quite different, often incompatible directions. I do
not claim that these litigations are altogether paradigmatic of the science-law-
politics conflict. Like all mammoth cases, they are unusual in certain respects.
I claim only that we can learn something from them about how one important




Bendectin was an anti-nausea drug marketed from 1956 until 1983 to some
30 million pregnant women for morning sickness until the manufacturer
removed it from the market, citing the high cost of litigation over the drug.
As recently as 1980, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved
Bendectin as safe and effective. Since 1977, when the first Bendectin case was
filed, more than 2100 suits have been brought alleging birth defects or infant
deaths caused by the drug. In each of the 27 cases that went to trial (25 of
them before a jury and one consolidating more than 800 claims) the central
factual issue was Bendectin's "general causation"-its capacity to cause the
kinds of injuries alleged by the plaintiffs. As is true in many but not all toxic
tort disputes, this issue was made vastly more difficult in the Bendectin cases
by the absence of either a pathognomonic ("signature") disease or a generally
accepted biological theory of causation. In almost all of these cases, essentially
the same scientific evidence on causation-consisting of epidemiological, in
vivo, in vitro, chemical structure, and secular trend studies-was presented in
much the same way, usually by the same expert witnesses. At trial, many
Bendectin plaintiffs won jury verdicts; indeed, their success rates were com-
19. See Ivy v. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 781 F. Supp. 902 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (concerning Agent
Orange), appealpending, No. 92-7275 (2d Cir.); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d
1128 (9th Cir. 1991) (concerning Bendectin), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 320 (Oct. 13, 1992) (No. 92-102).
20. The discussion that follows borrows heavily from a still unpublished account of the Bendectin
litigation, Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testimony of Causation in the Bendectin Cases
(1992) [hereinafter Sanders] (on file with author), which in turn draws on Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin
Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass Torts. 43 HASTINGS L.J. 301 (1992). See also Michael
D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency ofEvidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent
Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 643 (1992); PETER HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE:
JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM ch. 7 (1991).
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parable to those obtained in products liability cases generally. Some of these
jury verdicts were enormous; the most recent, rendered in September 1991,
awarded $33.75 million in compensatory and punitive damages.
The plaintiffs' success at trial, however, was utterly at variance with the
great weight of the scientific evidence on the drug's teratogenicity (i.e., its
capacity to cause birth defects). This body of evidence grew larger, more
rigorous, more consistent, and more unequivocal as the 1980s wore on. 2' It
strongly suggested to virtually all disinterested scientists that Bendectin was
unlikely to have caused the alleged birth defects and that any remaining doubt
on this score was probably irreducible. Moreover, since 1987, the federal
appellate courts (where most of the litigation has occurred) have firmly
endorsed this view of the evidence, taking the unusual step of reversing
plaintiffs' verdicts instead of simply remanding them for new trials. The
difference between the judges' and the juries' views of the plaintiffs' claims
in these cases is striking.22
This scientific and judicial consensus exonerating Bendectin makes it all
the more remarkable that the rate of plaintiff victories at trial did not decline
appreciably during the late 1980s and early 1990s. In fact, the two most recent
Bendectin trials, far from following this consensus, actually produced a hung
jury and the stunning $33.75 million award just mentioned. Thus science and
the law (at least as applied in jury verdicts) have gone off in opposite direc-
tions.
In an effort to explain this divergence, Professor Joseph Sanders recently
scrutinized the trial transcripts of a cross-section of Bendectin cases, hoping
to determine how the trial lawyers actually used and presented scientific
evidence on causation." His analysis focuses on the peculiar nature of the
legal process which filters and translates the scientific record into expert
testimony at trial.24
Five aspects of the process, Sanders finds, were especially problematic in
encouraging legal fact-finding to diverge from the scientific evidence offered
21. This was partly because investigating Bendectin's effects was easy relative to many other drugs.
Green, supra note 20, at 677-78. Green, a chronicler of the Bendectin litigation, agrees with Sanders that
"the scientific record on Bendectin's teratogenicity by the mid-to-late 1980s had become unusually rich."
id. at 677.
22. Michael Green points out that all of the plaintiffs' jury verdicts occurred either in Washington,
D.C. (4), Philadelphia (1), or Texas (2), while juries found for Merrell Dow (or hung) throughout the rest
of the country. He believes that the plaintiff verdicts were influenced by juries' wealth redistribution
motivations. Letter from Michael D. Green, Professor of Law, University of Iowa, College of Law, to
Peter H. Schuck, Simeon E. Baldwin Professor, Yale Law School (Dec. 17, 1992) (on file with author).
23. Sanders, supra note 20. Much of Sanders' analysis, though not his application to Bendectin,
follows Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 1113.
24. Another possible explanation for the divergence between science and legal outcome is incompetent
lawyering. This seems doubtful, however, since each side chose to use the same small group of lawyers
repeatedly throughout the litigation. A third possible explanation, incompetent juries, would be hard to
distinguish from Sanders' legal process explanation.
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in the Bendectin cases. First, expert witnesses were selected and deployed in
ways that made it hard for the fact-finder, whether jury or judge, to evaluate
and differentiate between their testimonies.' Second, the nature of the
experts' testimony made all of the science seem to be of equal worth and rele-
vance.26 Law's fact-finders are not blind, Sanders observes; instead they lack
"depth perception." Third, cross-examination seldom clarified the strengths
and weaknesses of witnesses' scientific testimony; instead, it ritualistically
centered on their putative biases and trivial misstatements. Fourth, Sanders
notes, the nature of the evidence and the structure of the legal issues made it
easier for the plaintiffs in Bendectin and other toxic tort cases to arrange the
evidence into a coherent, persuasive story than for the defendants to do so.
Finally, Sanders suggests that the juries in Bendectin and other toxic tort
cases may have discounted the kind of purely statistical evidence on causation,
including epidemiological studies, upon which the defendants in these cases
must often rely. Citing recent psychological experiments indicating that juries
evaluate evidence according to how well it "fits" into each of the competing
stories before them, he concludes that this may systematically advantage the
plaintiffs in such cases. While plaintiffs can prevail even if the jury believes
from the statistical evidence that the defendant's product can cause only a very
small fraction of the birth defects, defendants can prevail only if the jury
believes that the drug is incapable of causing any of them.
Because science and the jury-made law of Bendectin have taken diametri-
cally opposed paths,27 the politics of Bendectin has been free to move in
several directions. This litigation is now one of the "bloody shirts" waved by
partisans in order to mobilize public support in the struggle over products
liability reform. It has become a cause celebre for diverse interests. To those
who favor new restrictions on liability, for example, the Bendectin experience
demonstrates how a safe, socially valuable drug can be forced off the market
by malleable tort doctrines, costly nuisance claims, "junk science," and
irrational jury verdicts.28 To those who favor expanding (or at least retaining)
existing liability levels, however, Bendectin shows that a lay jury, not an elite
court, is the appropriate institution for resolving factual conflicts over expert
25. For example, those who actually conducted the research tended to be neglected in favor of
.secondary" experts; those who testified repeatedly tended to give more highly polished testimony; and
the same number of experts tended to testify on both sides of an issue, creating an illusion of equal
evidentiary weight. Sanders, supra note 20, at 24-36.
26. For example, the process and sequence through which expert testimony was introduced appeared
to give equal weight to different kinds of studies that actually have different probative value, such as in
vitro and epidemiological studies. Id. at 37-42.
27. According to Sanders, the science in Bendectin was also influenced by its intersection with the
law in that the litigation affected the volume of research on the topic and caused scientists to become
politicized on this issue. Letter from Joseph Sanders, Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center,
to Peter H. Schuck, Simeon E. Baldwin Professor, Yale Law School (Jan. 11, 1993) (on file with author).
28. The epithet "junk science," which has entered the political lexicon, was apparently coined by Peter
Huber. See HUBER, supra note 20, at 2.
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scientific testimony on causation.29 The two sides talk past each other precise-
ly because, as discussed in Part II, each speaks the language and invokes the
values of a different culture. In order to achieve mutual intelligibility, they
must turn to a third, hopefully more integrative culture-politics. As we shall
also see, however, politics is not always a faithful translator.
B. Agent Orange"
The Agent Orange litigation exemplifies an intriguingly different relation-
ship among science, law, and politics. Like the Bendectin litigation, it was
launched in the late 1970s and continues today, although the main action in
Agent Orange ended in the late 1980s. The case was spawned by America's
involvement in the Vietnam War, a watershed in American politics, and
became a controversy of immense proportions, involving a plaintiff class of
2.4 million people (ultimately producing about 250,000 individual claims),
much of the chemical industry, and the U.S. Government. In addition to the
$180 million required to settle the class action, the main parties (not counting
the government) incurred litigation costs that certainly exceeded $110 million.
Because of the case's connection to the war and its high public profile, it also
occasioned intense political and organizational activity by veterans groups'at
the federal and state levels, a factor that distinguishes it from the more frag-
mented Bendectin litigation.
As with Bendectin, the central issue of fact was general causation-whether
the dioxin contaminant of Agent Orange could have caused the veterans'
cancers and other chronic diseases in light of the amount and conditions, of
their exposure to it. Because the injuries could not be traced to a single cause
(as in the case of asbestosis), but instead could have been produced by' a
number of different factors, proof of causation was peculiarly dependent on
naked statistical evidence rather than on direct evidence of exposure to the
single causal agent. It was also more difficult to establish the soldiers' levels
of exposure to Agent Orange under highly variable wartime conditions than
to measure a woman's exposure to a drug, like Bendectin, taken under pre-
scription. The plaintiffs' diseases had long latency periods in Agent Orange;
in Bendectin, however, they were manifest at birth.
Causation, then, was even harder to resolve here than it was in Bendectin.
But the body of scientific evidence bearing on Agent Orange's toxic effects
was also larger, including numerous animal and epidemiological studies. In
29. At least one prominent plaintiffs lawyer and defender of the tort system has been critical of the
Bendectin litigation. Paul Rheingold, It's Time to Change the System on Junk-Science, Quack-Expert Issues,
MANHATTAN LAW., Nov. 1-7, 1988, at 13.
30. The account that follows is taken largely from PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL:
MASS Toxic DISASTERS IN THE COURTS (enlarged ed. 1987). See also Green, supra note 20, at 659-61.
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theory, the latter were especially valuable for inferring causation; they were
based on human populations and reflected a kind of "natural experiment"
(since only individuals in Vietnam had been substantially exposed to Agent
Orange). Some of these epidemiological studies, moreover, were unusually
large and well-designed. 3
All Agent Orange cases were in effect consolidated in a single federal
court, obviating the prospect of the inconsistent verdicts that so plagued the
Bendectin litigation. After settling the class action, the judge, Jack Weinstein,
turned to the several hundred remaining "opt-out" cases. Having studied and
mastered the scientific evidence to a degree that few other judges would even
attempt, Judge Weinstein ruled that the animal studies were not helpful in
proving the etiology of the plaintiffs' conditions, that "the only useful studies
having any bearing on causation" were the epidemiological studies, that the
best of these were negative, and that plaintiffs' scientific experts had not even
discussed them. Since plaintiffs' experts' conclusions about causation were
based wholly on their examination of individual medical records, which Judge
Weinstein deemed irrelevant to proof of causation in such a case, he flatly
excluded their testimony and dismissed the opt-out plaintiffs' cases. This
dismissal was upheld by the appellate court, albeit on grounds other than the
causation evidence.32
Judge Weinstein's rulings on the causation evidence in Agent Orange have
raised fundamental issues about the appropriate boundaries between the
domains of science and law. May a judge, trained as a lawyer, simply reject
on its scientific merits the testimony of reputable scientists concerning a
complex causal issue within their professional ken? May he exclude from the
jury's consideration a large body of scientific evidence simply because he
thinks that the jury might misunderstand it? May he insist that only epidemio-
logical evidence, with all its flaws, constitutes acceptable proof of causation?
May he treat as "negative" epidemiological evidence that most scientists would
say is merely "inconclusive"? Does the fact that he could exclude testimony
based on novel methods or principles mean that he may also exclude novel
scientific opinions based on conventional methods or principles?
These issues are highly controversial in the legal culture. The manner in
which the courts resolved them in Agent Orange and Bendectin has affected
the courts' handling of causation evidence in other toxic tort cases, establishing
a kind of "epidemiological threshold" that plaintiffs must cross in order to
avoid having their claims dismissed.33 As in Bendectin, the tensions between
science and law on these questions have created special opportunities for
31. Interview with Dr. Jan Stolwijk, Professor of Epidemiology, Yale School of Public Health, in
New Haven, Conn. (Oct. 23, 1985).
32. SCHUCK, supra note 30, at 226-44, 301.
33. See Green, supra note 20, at 672.
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politicians. Despite (or perhaps because of) Judge Weinstein's firm conclusion
that the scientific evidence did not establish Agent Orange's causal responsibili-
ty for human cancers, and despite subsequent epidemiological studies and other
analyses that tended to confirm the accuracy of his conclusion,34 political
pressures induced the Veterans Administration, and then Congress, to grant
permanent disability benefits to veterans suffering from two forms of
cancer. 
35
My point is not that Judge Weinstein was correct and the VA and Congress
wrong. Indeed, they may all have been correct, since each was responding to
a somewhat different question and thus operating under a different standard
of proof.36 The more pertinent point is that when neither scientific nor legal
technocrats can furnish authoritative answers to problems arising at the increas-
ingly crowded intersection of science and law, we must expect politicians to
bridge the gap, using the uncertainty as a reason (perhaps a pretext) to supply
their own answers.
Why are authoritative answers at the science-law frontier so elusive that
politicians must intervene? The inherent complexity of the problems is aggra-
vated by the short time frames that public law and public opinion frequently
demand and the limited problem-solving resources that they provide. Often-as
when the issue is whether exposure to low levels of a chemical caused a tort
plaintiffs cancer-the question is "trans-scientific" (to use physicist Alvin
Weinberg's term): although it can be formulated in scientific terms, it cannot
34. See, e.g., Marilyn Fingerhutetal., Cancer Mortality in Workers Exposed to 2,3,7,8-Tetracholoro-
dibenzo-p-Dioxin, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 212 (1991); Warren E. Leary, High Dioxin Levels Linked to
Cancer, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1991, at A16 (stating that Fingerhut study found increased incidence of soft-
tissue sarcomas in workers with dioxin levels in their blood of 3600 parts per trillion (ppt), but found no
excess cancer in workers with levels of 640 ppt; Vietnam veterans exposed to Agent Orange had levels
of 45 to 400 ppt); Warren E. Leary, Higher Risk ofRare Cancer Foundfor Vietnam Veterans, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 30, 1990, at A 10 (noting that veterans showed no increased rate of five suspect cancers, but did show
increased rate of sixth cancer, non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, but that rate of this cancer was highest among
sailors on ships, who had least exposure to Agent Orange); Keith Schneider, Panel of Scientists Finds
Dioxin Does Not Pose Widespread Cancer Threat, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1992, at 9 (stating that EPA-
convened panel finds human cancer risks confined to chemical workers and victims of dioxin-related
industrial accidents). In mid-1991, an Illinois appeals court threw out a $16.28 million jury verdict against
Monsanto, the manufacturer of a chemical containing a tiny quantity of dioxin, for a train spill of the
chemical in Missouri which occasioned one of the longest jury trials in American history. The court's ruling
reflected the fact that the jury did not find that dioxin had caused plaintiffs any actual injury. Kemner v.
Monsanto Co., 576 N.E.2d 1146 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
35. Adam Clymer, Bill Passed to Aid Veterans Affectedby Agent Orange, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1991,
at B6 (stating law covers non-Hodgkins lymphoma and soft-tissue sarcoma). This law also granted disability
benefits for chloracne, a condition that had previously been found to be caused by dioxin exposure. Since
then, the VA has also granted benefits to certain victims suffering from peripheral neuropathy. See Vietnam
Veterans to Get Benefits for Ailment 7ied to Agent Orange, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1991, at B6.
36. For Judge Weinstein, the question was whether the veterans should be able to shift their losses
to the chemical companies (and, ultimately, to the government), and the standard was therefore relatively
demanding ("preponderance of the evidence"). For the VA, it was whether its statute required, permitted,
or precluded its paying compensation for certain illnesses. For Congress, it was simply a policy question,
essentially unconstrained by any legal standard, as to whether certain illnesses should be compensated.
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be conclusively answered by science alone. In these cases we must also look
to other, non-scientific criteria of decision.37
This trans-science problem, however, is minimized in the Bendectin and
Agent Orange cases. 3 Although expert witnesses can almost always be found
to create an issue of fact, the scientific conclusion was not in genuine doubt
in either of these cases.39 By the time the courts had to rule in them, main-
stream science had reached a reasonably firm consensus that the evidence did
not establish causation.' ° The real issue in these cases, then, was not the
scientific consensus on causation but rather science's authority, legitimacy, and
intelligibility in the larger, transcendent worlds of law and politics.
Even so, the fact that the legal outcomes in Bendectin and Agent Orange
turned out to be consistent with the best available science is only mildly
reassuring, for in both cases this convergence required extraordinary judicial
interventions-reversal of jury verdicts in Bendectin and close technical
scrutiny of expert testimony in Agent Orange. With less audacious courts, both
cases could easily have gone the other way.4 These narrow victories remind
us that important social decisions can be distorted when agents of one culture
control decisions more properly governed by another culture operating under
quite different rules. Such mismatches of authority and competence will often
produce costly decision processes that generate substantive outcomes of
doubtful legitimacy, if not outright error.42 Cultural imperialism can be as
problematic in domestic policymaking as in world politics.
37. See Wendy Wagner, Trans-Science in Tons, 96 YALE L.J. 428, 431 n.20 (1986).
38. We should remember that for all their complexity, they were "easy" cases in this limited sense.
Multi-cultural conflict often takes much more intractable forms.
39. Another example of such a case is Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 615 F. Supp. 262 (N.D.
Ga. 1985), involving the alleged teratogenicity of a contraceptive jelly. It is discussed in these very terms
in Gross, supra note 23, at 1121-24.
40. The qualifications are necessary even here because some contrary scientific testimony, which
plaintiff proffered but the lower courts excluded, purports to discredit the defendant's negative studies. The
excludability of this testimony is now at issue before the Supreme Court. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991) (excluding testimony of Dr. Shanna Helen Swan),
cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 320 (Oct. 13, 1992) (No. 92-102). For a discussion of the excludability controver-
sy, see Eliot Marshall, Supreme Court to Weigh Science, 259 SCIENCE 588 (1993).
41. As it was, the outcome in Bendectin came only after a socially valuable drug was removed from
the market. See infra text accompanying note 70.
42. American policymaking may be uniquely pathological in these respects. Whether the substantive
issue is regulation of toxic substances, nuclear power plants, occupational safety and health, or environmen-
tal protection more generally, important policy decisions are fiercely contested, always open to reconsidera-
tion, and subject to competing criteria ofjustification. See, e.g., RONALD BRIcKMAN ET AL., CONTROLLING
CHEMICALS: THE POLITICS OF REGULATION IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 301-02, 312-13 (1985);
JOSEPH BADARACCO, JR., LOADING THE DICE (1985); STEVEN KELMAN, REGULATING AMERICA,
REGULATING SWEDEN: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH POLICY (1981);
EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASON-
ABLENESS (1982); DAVID VOGEL, NATIONAL STYLES OF REGULATION: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN GREAT
BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES (1986).
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Although defining and defending each culture's appropriate jurisdiction are
hard tasks, as I discuss in Part III, the difficulties in defending whatever
jurisdictions are defined are even greater. The combatants in public policy
struggles will always attempt to obscure whatever jurisdictional lines have been
drawn. Special interests-whether engaged in institutional design, justificatory
rhetoric, litigation, or legislative-bureaucratic politics-strategically deploy
some expedient mixture of scientific "facts," legal "principles," and political
consensus norms. Jurisdictional line drawing is pointless unless these lines can
be defended, in which case trans-cultural understanding, respect, and cross-
fertilization become even more imperative to reduce the now greater risk that
each culture will wall itself off into a dangerous isolation.
II. THE COMPETING CULTURES
Before I proceed, a caveat. In order to contrast science, law, and politics,
one must characterize the three cultures in ways that are stylized but hopefully
not caricatured. The generalizations I make about each culture are subject to
important exceptions, qualifications, and distinctions. Although I note these
refinements, my approach-which exaggerates the purity, consistency, and
exclusivity of each culture's normative structure-risks some over-simplifica-
tion. If one hopes to identify the major lines of cultural cleavage, anticipate
the conflicts that they are increasingly engendering, and consider how they
might be ameliorated, this risk cannot be avoided altogether.
I organize the analysis of each culture around three different dimensions:
(1) the central values to which members of the culture subscribe; (2) the incen-
tive structures that animate the culture's members and the decision techniques




Given Snow's purpose, one might have expected him to be a kind of
anthropologist of the scientific culture, probing its deep structure. In fact, he
tells us rather little about it. Scientists, he observes, are optimistic and
practical, concerned above all else with understanding nature and solving
problems." He maintains that they read few literary books and have under-
43. SNOW, supra note 2, at 6-7.
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developed imaginations." He notes, however, that the scientific culture is not
monolithic, suggesting that pure scientists have little more in common with
engineers and other applied scientists than with literary intellectuals.45 Snow
surely exaggerates here, for whatever the differences among scientific subcul-
tures, there is a core of beliefs, training, and techniques common to those who
are recognized as scientists by the scientific community, at least as convention-
ally defined."
What constitutes this common core? Peter Huber, an engineer-lawyer who
is a militant scientific positivist and a caustic critic of the law's treatment of
scientific evidence, asserts that "[t]he scientific ideal stands in sharp contrast
to the windy agnosticism of the modern philosopher, litigator, or social
engineer."" Huber holds that the modern scientist is not dogmatic but is
instead "a credulous skeptic-skeptic in that he demands serious evidence and
proof; credulous in that he concedes, not just offhandedly but very system-
atically, that every measurement, correlation, analysis, or theory may contain
some margin of error, which may in turn conceal important but unrecognized
new truth."48 Science, Huber insists, is the domain of systematic verification
to which social purposes are quite irrelevant.49
Other commentators, less tendentious than Huber, are also less certain of
science's detached, ahistorical objectivity. Sheila Jasanoff, reviewing the work
of historians and sociologists of science, notes three of their major findings.5"
First, scientific facts are not immanent in an objective reality waiting to be
discovered by any scientists who look in the right place. Instead, they are
constructed and validated through a social process dominated by those in the
scientific community who possess authority to do so. Second, this validation
process is itself shaped by the scientific paradigms, the shared assumptions and
prejudices of the professional community that dominate the thought of a
44. Id. at 12-13.
45. Id. at 31-32. Today, the colloquial appellations "hard" and "soft" as applied to the natural and
social sciences denote important differences in their training, methodologies, public support, and prestige.
46. This qualification about the conventional definition of scientific communities follows recent
research findings in the field of sociology of science. See infra text accompanying notes 50-51. This work
emphasizes that scientific "facts," like the scientific enterprise itself, are socially constructed; they are
recognized as facts only if (in a recent formulation) "they are produced in accordance with prior agreements
about the rightness of particular theories, experimental methods, instrumentation techniques, validation
procedures, review processes, and the like. These agreements, in turn, are socially derived through
continual negotiation and renegotiation among relevant bodies of scientists." Non-science institutions-
including legal fact-finders like judges and juries-also participate in the construction of science. Sheila
Jasanoff, What Judges Should Know About the Sociology of Science, 32 JURIMETRICS J. 345, 347, 356-58,
& sources cited (1992). This issue is discussed in greater detail at infra text accompanying notes 113-116.
47. HUBER, supra note 20, at 221.
48. Id. at 222.
49. Id. at 221-22; see also Steven Goldberg, The Reluctant Embrace: Law and Science in America,
75 GEO L.J. 1341, 1343 (1987). Huber's formulation recalls Robert K. Merton's earlier notion of
"organized skepticism" as a central element of the scientific ethos. ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY
AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 542 (1968).
50. See JASANOFF, supra note 6, at 12-14; see also Jasanoff, supra note 46.
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particular period. These paradigms hold sway for reasons that may have less
to do with their intrinsic merit than with their support of existing social
structures, including the scientific establishment. Third, the authority to
validate science rests in part on boundary-drawing and other strategic behavior
by scientific disputants, behavior that can effectively exclude their less influen-
tial competitors.
To these findings, one might add another so obvious that it may easily
escape notice. For most scientists, the search for particular facts is not guided
solely by their autonomous, spontaneous curiosity. Instead, the search is
constrained and channeled by the resources available for research, which in
turn reflect the priorities of politicians, corporations, foundations, and other
sources of funding for science.
This insistence on the contingent, socially constructed, and validated,
resource-constrained character of scientific paradigms and propositions,
especially in areas of great uncertainty or in which dominant views are firmly
institutionalized, is an important antidote to the more transcendent, universal
pretensions of certain conceptions of science. But it would be equally wrong
to conclude from the fact of science's social embeddedness that its culture is
as flexible, indeterminate, and relativistic as those of law and politics. In its
professional norms and aspirations, and to some extent in its actual perfor-
mance, science is committed to a conception of truth (though one that is always
provisional and contestable) reached through a conventional methodology of
proof (though one that can be difficult to apply and interpret) based upon the
testing of falsifiable propositions."'
2. Incentives and Techniques
What motivates scientists to behave as they do in their professional
settings? Like other highly educated people, of course, they are driven by a
desire for professional recognition, economic security, social influence, job
satisfaction, and intellectual stimulation, among other things. But some of the
goals that motivate them are peculiar, if not unique, to the scientific culture.
Perhaps most important, scientists subscribe to and are actuated by rigorous
standards of empirical investigation and proof; to deviate from these standards
is to be deemed professionally incompetent, or worse. Scientists also define
themselves in part by their membership in larger scientific communities that
both contribute to, and are entitled to exploit, their own work. These principles
of peer review invigorate and enforce their adherence to a norm of extreme
caution (Huber's "credulous skepticism").
51. For one consensus statement of this faith, see Amicus Brief of 72 Nobel Laureates, 17 State
Academies of Science, and 7 Other Scientific Organizations in Support of Appellees at 23-24, Edwards
v. Aguillard, No. 85-1513 (U.S. 1993).
16
Vol. 11:1, 1993
Multi-Culturalism Redux: Science, Law, and Politics
These values and incentives lead to a distinctive set of scientific practices
and techniques. I have just noted the importance of peer review. Other practic-
es reflect science's changing context. The team approach to research, for
example, has become the norm as science fragments into a large number of
increasingly narrow technical specialties and as intricate research problems cut
across these specialty boundaries. Today, much research requires a large
investment of time, money, staff, and other resources for which scientists must
vigorously compete, yet the payoffs in basic knowledge or in practical applica-
tion are highly uncertain and often far in the future. Contemporary science,
then, is a high-risk activity requiring large aggregations of capital and talent
as well as techniques for diversifying the risks of failure. For all these reasons,
much scientific enterprise has grown more collaborative, corporate, and
dependent upon government support.52 In most fields, the solitary investigator
is becoming an inspiring relic of an increasingly anachronistic, Renaissance
vision of science. Today, teamwork is more the norm.53
In addition, the time frame of science is relatively open-ended. It is true,
of course, that competitive pressures often demand speed where a discovery
may have important commercial applications, as in pharmaceutical research.
Nevertheless, science-especially basic research-tends to move in its own,
largely autonomous rhythms. These rhythms are dictated by the pace of
technological development and dissemination, the availability of resources for
further investigation, and the process of consensus formation among scientists.
Imposing arbitrary deadlines cannot accelerate these factors.
3. Biases and Orientations
Like all cultures, science nurtures certain biases, blind spots, and predispo-
sitions. Most scientists receive an intensely technical training, face strong
incentives to follow highly specialized career paths, and must keep up with
voluminous research literatures that are often more specialized still. Generalist
scientists today are few and far between. These conditions foster a decidedly
narrow, technocratic perspective. Their hunger for the respect of other
scientists, buttressed by peer review, causes the vast majority to shun advocacy
of controversial positions on technical issues in the mass media or other non-
52. Even so, basic science operates with relative freedom from the "day-to-day judicial and political
constraints common elsewhere in American society." Goldberg, supra note 49, at 1364.
53. Nevertheless, a reaction against "big science" seems to have set in recently. This is visible not
only in the public sector, where massive high-technology projects such as the supercollider and Star Wars
have encountered much scientific and congressional opposition, see Malcolm W. Browne, Budget Plans
Worry Some Scientists, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1993, at 20, col. 3, but also in the private sector, where
many market-driven firms-be they giants like Bell Labs and IBM or small biotech and software start-ups-
have decentralized their research and development activities on the theory that scientific innovation is more
likely to flourish in less bureaucratic settings. It is generally accepted that new jobs are disproportionately
generated by smaller firms.
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professional public forums, including courtrooms and legislative hearings.
Doubtful about lay understanding and fearful of being misinterpreted, they tend
to be far more comfortable reporting on their work in the precise, qualified,
technical language of the peer-reviewed journal than holding press conferences
to announce their latest findings to reporters whose scientific training may not
extend much beyond a course in biology taken many years ago. Skittish about
active involvement in politics and wary of lawyers and other professional
advocates who do not subscribe to their distinctive canons, they prefer the
familiar environments of the laboratory, the seminar room, and the specialized
scientific meeting to the courtroom or talk show.54
Experimental scientists are preoccupied with the process of unearthing hard
facts; their goal is discovery, their master techniques are the analysis of data
and the testing of theories. Unlike lawyers and politicians, there is little in their
training, professional norms or work environment that gives them a sophisticat-
ed understanding of social value conflicts or equips them even to address such
conflicts. The political process that pits science against other normative systems
is the bailiwick of specialized science bureaucrats. For most practicing scien-
tists, however, politics is terra incognita. Scientists' uneasiness around
politicians is really a special case of their more general suspicion of populism.
One defining feature of any culture is its orientation toward the roles of expert
and lay judgments in conferring legitimate authority on decisions, and science
is no exception. Its distinctive position can be illustrated if we imagine a
spectrum along which attitudes about the sources of legitimate decision-making
authority are arrayed, with professional autonomy at the left-hand pole and lay
decision making on the right-hand pole.55 Science, with its technocratic
commitments to rigorous method, objectivity, and expert judgment, would
occupy the professional autonomy pole; pure science would be on the extreme
left and applied science to its right. As we shall see in our discussion of the
other two cultures, expert bureaucracy would lie a bit further to the right,
law-divided into non-jury and jury components-would lie somewhere near
the middle, while political bureaucracy would be located nearer the lay
decision-making pole. (The market and familism are included in order to fill
out the extreme right-hand position.)
54. Partly for this reason, "[llegal control of technology provides something more of a jolt to the
scientist than it does to the lawyer." Goldberg, supra note 49, at 1368.
55. On this point, I am indebted to Bruce Ackerman, who has elaborated a somewhat analogous
distinction between the ideal types of "scientific policy-maker" and "ordinary observer." BRUCE ACKER-
MAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 10-20 (1977).
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As this spectrum suggests, science harbors a deep aversion to populist
legitimations of decision-making authority; many dangerously false claims have
been propagated in the name of public opinion. Science exalts instead the
trained expert who possesses esoteric knowledge and who adheres to values
and methods that ordinary people can scarcely understand. The scientific spirit
of "credulous skepticism" rejects folk wisdom and conventional assumptions
that cannot pass through the profession's fine-meshed empirical screen. 6
These broad generalizations about the culture of science, of course,
describe what is in fact a far more complex social reality. Many exceptions
should properly be noted. For example, scientist-writers like Stephen Jay
Gould57 and C.P. Snow himself exhibit a broad humanistic vision reflecting
their deep familiarity with the literary culture. Scientists like Barry Commoner
and Samuel Epstein are ardent controversialists who gravitate eagerly to the
public forum;58 many others are also perfectly delighted when the science
reporter from the New York Times or even USA Today calls to discuss their
work. Certain distinguished scientists turn out to be fine science bureaucrats
as well; examples include Maxine Singer and Rene Dubos. The canons of
scientific proof are not as clear-cut as they seem; they contain (and conceal)
difficult issues of methodology and interpretation, as the many disputes over
56. Given this bias, it is not surprising that scientists (other than science bureaucrats) find Congressman
John Dingell's ongoing crusade to "cleanse" science of its elitist practices and pretensions incomprehensible,
which may explain why they have been so ineffectual in opposing it. See Robert Cook, A Capital Collision,
NEWSDAY, May 9, 1989, at 3; Bernard D. Davis, Fraud vs. Error: The Dingelling of Science, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 8, 1989, at 14.
57. E.g., STEPHEN J. GOULD, BULLY FOR BRONTOSAURUS: REFLECTIONS IN NATURAL HISTORY
(1991).
58. Barry Commoner's involvement in the public forum has included running for President in 1980.
Philip Shabecoff, Commoner Says Victory is Not Object of His Drive, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1980, at B19.
Dr. Samuel Epstein's participation in the public arena has included numerous appearances before Congress
testifying on a variety of scientific issues. See CONGRESSIONAL INFORMATION SERVICE INDEX (listing at
least 17 appearances by Dr. Epstein as a witness at congressional hearings since 1974).
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environmental carcinogens attest.59 And there are always scientists-some
"clinical ecologists," for example-who flagrantly violate those canons.6'
Some distinctions should also be drawn. For example, the conventional
contrast between "hard" and "soft" sciences tracks important divisions that
belie the merely superficial unity of the scientific culture.6 ' Although
physicians are scientifically trained, they do not approach data in the same
manner as do practicing scientists.62 Theoretical and experimental scientists
do quite different things and think in different ways. Even within a particular
scientific specialty or sub-specialty, practices and values are likely to vary
among countries, regions, and even research groups in the same locality.
Although it is common to speak of the scientific "community" (and I do so
here), such usage is a rather quaint way to describe what has in fact become
a fragmented profession.
In addition to these exceptions and distinctions, some qualifications are in
order. Science has changed a great deal since the time that Snow wrote. Peer
review has come under severe criticism as an inadequate and sometimes
corrupt method of regulating a given profession.63 Moreover, despite (or
perhaps because of) the remarkable success of many branches of science in
improving the conditions of life, the gap between the demand for and the
supply of research funds has widened. This development has significantly
altered the norms and practices of science. It is no longer enough for scientists
to describe and analyze interesting phenomena: in order to justify continued
financial support, even pure researchers must demonstrate how others will be
able to use their work. Science is no longer the self-contained, autonomous
enclave it once was. Instead, researchers must increasingly interact with and
satisfy the outside interests on whom they have come to depend. But even
recognizing these exceptions, qualifications, and changes, the theory and
59. E.g., Gio B. Bori, Overturning the Verdict on Carcinogens, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 1992. Indeed,
last year the National Toxicology Program's [NTPI Board of Scientific Findings issued an advisory review
of NTP in which it suggested that the scientific methodology upon which the NTP relies in classifying
compounds as carcinogens may not present any significant threat of cancer to human beings. See also What
Price Cleanup, N.Y.TIMEs, Mar. 21-26, 1993 (series of five articles highlighting some of the mistakes
of American environmental policy).
60. See, e.g., discussion of Bertram Carnow in HUBER, supra note 20, at 92-93. For a recent
lampoon-editorial on this subject, see Daniel E. Koshland, Jr., The Great Overcoat Scare, 259 SCIENCE
1807 (Mar. 26, 1993).
61. See supra note 45.
62. According to one research scientist who also treats patients, clinicians tend to be much less
rigorous; they tend to seek only enough data to enable them to be comfortable with their best clinical
judgments. Telephone Interview with Dr. Leonard Milstone, Associate Professor of Dermatology, Yale
University School of Medicine (Dec. 22, 1992).
63. See, e.g., Symposium, Guarding the Guardians: Research on Editorial Peer Review, 263 JAMA
1306 (1990) (cited in Amicus Brief of the American Association for the Advancement of Science and the
National Academy of Sciences at 16, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 92-102 (U.S.
filed Jan. 19. 1993) [hereinafter Amicus Brief]). For present purposes, however, the more important point
is that "[e]ven the most vocal critics of the peer review system do not ... recommend that it be disman-
tled." Amicus Brief, supra, at 16-17.
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practice of science exhibit enough normative coherence and behavioral
regularity that one can fairly speak of science as a culture, as a way of seeing,
thinking, valuing, and acting that distinguishes it from other cultures,
particularly law and politics.
B. Law
If the scientific culture, with its emphasis on rigorous methodology and
proof, is arcane and remote from public view and common experience, the
legal culture-or at least much of it-is to the average citizen more conspicu-
ous (e.g., the imagery of trial), part of the vernacular (the language of rights),
and numbingly familiar (the preparation of tax returns).'
1. Central Values
Law's version of truth only dimly resembles the version advanced by
science. Indeed, the notion of verifiable truth to which scientists appeal in their
experiments and research bears almost no relationship to the conception of
truth ordinarily pursued in legal proceedings. Legal principles are normative
propositions about which particular states of the social world should be sought,
not positive statements about how the natural or social world does in fact work.
Legal principles seek and find their justification in arguments derived from a
bewildering array of social policy goals: fairness, efficiency, administrative
cost, wealth distribution, and morality, among others. Legal decision-makers
balance these goals in non-rigorous, often intuitive ways that are seldom
acknowledged and sometimes ineffable.65 Moreover, courts explicitly invoke
other considerations in support of their decisions that are essentially social
policies in disguise.66 Even the classic principle of stare decisis, for example,
appeals to the policies of predictability, expectations, and decision cost minimi-
zation. The practice of analogical reasoning appeals to the policy of treating
like cases alike. The principle of deference to particular institutions appeals
to the policy of specialized, expert decision making.
This difference between science and law entails a fundamental distinction
between the pursuit of "truth" (science's province) and the pursuit of "justice"
64. I do not mean to deny, of course, that much of the legal culture is inaccessible to non-lawyers,
a phenomenon that has provided grist for satirists and critics throughout the ages. I am simply comparing
law to science in this regard.
65. See generally MICHAEL POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE (1958).
66. The relationship between principles and policies is developed in RONALD H. DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
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(law's province).67 I hasten to add that this familiar distinction is one of
degree only. Both paradigms are ideal types, abstractions employed to isolate
some of their essential features rather than to represent a far more complex
reality. In this connection, I have noted that scientific fact-finding is not wholly
objective; its data, methods, interpretation, and authoritativeness are contextu-
al, contingent, and often controversial.6
By the same token, the justice sought by law is not purely subjective, not
simply in the eye of the beholder. It is true, of course, that notions of justice
do vary with time and place, and that the most bitter, protracted debates in any
society revolve around its meaning. But justice does contain a more objective
component. Ultimately, its normative claims depend upon the truth value-
defined in a relatively rigorous, scientific sense-of the empirical propositions
that at least implicitly underlie those claims. Law's legitimacy, at least in the
long run, rests in part upon its ability to generate outcomes that are more or
less correct. To be "correct," an outcome must comport with the common
morality and common sense of the lay community, and also command the
respect of the relevant communities of experts. If instead these lay and expert
communities come to view the legal system's errors of fact or law as system-
atic or otherwise substantial, they are bound to call law's integrity and utility
into question.
How much may law deviate from scientific truth before its legitimacy is
jeopardized? Like conceptions of justice, a society's tolerance for legal error
is a variable, not a constant. Changes in public attitudes, political discourse,
and scientific opinion can alter the level of legal error that society, and hence
the law, will accept.69 The Bendectin litigation illustrates the point. In a few
of the early cases, juries found that Bendectin caused birth defects; some juries
even awarded punitive damages against the producer. As studies casting doubt
on the drug's causal responsibility proliferated in the early to mid-1980s, the
scientific community responded by strongly criticizing the evidence on which
these findings had been based. In time, this criticism undermined, and in some
cases reversed, the earlier decisions. More important, it contributed to a more
general discrediting of the tort system. This system, after all, managed to
67. These labels, of course, are conventional. See John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of
Procedure, 66 CAL. L. REV. 541 (1978). Those authors view "truth" as concerned with cognitive conflicts
and "justice" as concerned with conflicts of interest. Id. at 543-44.
68. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
69. Even in criminal procedure, where a libertarian bias favoring false negatives over false positives
is particularly strong ("it is better that nine guilty defendants go free than that one innocent defendant be
wrongfully convicted"), there are social limits to the bias. This is indicated by the intense, continuing
debates over the appropriate standards for bail and preventive detention, the minimum size of the jury,
and the scope of the habeas corpus remedy. In civil law, bitter controversies over the location and shifting
of burdens of proof likewise demonstrate how society's views concerning permissible error levels change
over time. A recent example is § 105 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, which amended
§ 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2), to overrule
the Supreme Court's decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 403 U.S. 642 (1988).
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discover the error only after Bendectin had been driven off the market,
depriving consumers of an often effective and unique remedy for a serious
condition, and only after its manufacturer had incurred more than $100 million
in legal fees.70 The law's repudiation of bad science in the Bendectin litigation
thus came tragically late.
Today, the law seems to be demanding greater reliability of scientific
claims before it will honor them, although evidence of this shift remains
fragmentary. Some courts, perhaps emboldened by Judge Weinstein's exhaus-
tive scrutiny of the expert medical testimony in the Agent Orange case,71 have
recently insisted upon greater rigor in the law's use and interpretation of
scientific evidence, especially on the issue of causation in toxic tort cases.72
A swelling chorus of scientifically informed commentary has also criticized
the law's traditional approach to technical evidence. 73 Even more significant
in the long run, perhaps, the Environmental Protection Agency is currently
conducting a thorough reevaluation of its diverse risk assessment method-
ologies, a review prompted in part by widespread criticism of that approach
74by many prominent scientists and economists.
These convergences between the standards of truth in science and in law
are noteworthy and on the whole encouraging, but the more general point
remains: the two cultures characteristically pursue fundamentally different
ends-verifiable fact for the one, and justice for the other. This difference also
implies that science and law have different orientations toward the distributive
consequences that their activities generate. Many individual scientists, of
course, care deeply about whom their findings benefit and burden, yet the
culture of science in principle must take a dispassionate stance on that question.
The canons of science, after all, dictate that if research uncovers a new truth,
scientists must not suppress it but should instead let the chips fall where they
may. In principle, at least, how society ultimately decides to use (or misuse)
scientific facts is a separate question about which they may feel strongly but
usually possess no special expertise.
70. For a pithy discussion of this episode, see HUBER, supra note 20, at 111-29. The high litigation
costs, unfortunately, are not peculiar to Bendectin. They have been much higher in Agent Orange cases,
see SCHUCK, supra note 30, at 5, and in asbestos cases, see Schuck, The Worst Should Go First: Deferral
Registries in Asbestos Litigation, 15 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 541, 553-68 (1992).
71. See generally SCHUCK, supra note 30.
72. Green, supra note 20, at 666.
73. E.g., Troyen A. Brennan, Causal Chains and Statistical Links: The Role of Scientific Uncertainty
in Hazardous-Substance Litigation, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 469, 494-500 (1988) (discussing cases); Bert
Black & David E. Lilienfeld, Epidemiological Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 732
(1984); Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts,
85 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1985). For a scientist's critique of science's own approach to such evidence,
see Alvan R. Feinstein, Scientific Standards in Epidemiological Studies of the Menace of Daily Life, 242
SCIENCE 1257 (1988) (criticizing much current methodology).
74. See Robin Shifrin, Note, Not By Risk Alone: Reforming EPA Research Priorities, 102 YALE L.J.
547, 553 (1992).
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In contrast, the legal culture is anything but neutral about the distribution
of outcomes, even in principle. It is normative to its core. The law, of course,
defines rights and duties with desired substantive outcomes very much in view
when it protects property, proscribes criminal conduct, exacts taxes, supports
wars, demands equal treatment for similarly situated groups, and regulates
social and economic relationships. Practicing lawyers are expected to advocate
their clients' biases and implement their agendas; failure to do so may consti-
tute professional malpractice. Academic lawyers routinely elaborate legal
theories designed to promote values they personally prefer. Among those in
the field of law, only judges are expected to put aside their normative goals
when those goals conflict with the properly understood rule of law.
2. Incentives and Techniques
The incentives that motivate legal actors are varied but largely convention-
al. In this respect, the law is no different than other cultures. Some of the
incentives that shape lawyers' conduct, however, are distinctive to their
professional milieus. For practicing lawyers, the decisive incentive is the need,
consistent with both self-interest and professional ethics, to effectively repre-
sent the client's interests, whatever those interests may be. The lawyer's
income (if not always her psychic well-being) is enhanced by her willingness
to subordinate her personal policy views to those of her client. Somewhat
paradoxically, this substantive self-abnegation actually reinforces, and then
rationalizes, the legal culture's singularly powerful normative thrust by ensur-
ing that any client that can afford to hire a lawyer can enjoy some access to
the policy-making and adjudicative processes, where it can press its claims.75
Where the scientist's "clients" are verifiable facts waiting to be revealed and
used, the lawyer's are social interests seeking gratification and advancement.
Lawyers' strong client orientation also colors how incentive structures in
the two cultures treat uncertainty and complexity. Paradigmatically, science
progresses by generating new data and hypotheses that often undermine the
then-dominant theories. When this occurs, the resulting uncertainties and
complexities may persist for a long time; although these uncertainties often
contain the seeds for new progress, they must first germinate.76 Despite this
tendency toward uncertainty and complexity, however, science's ultimate goals
are precisely the opposite: it seeks the most parsimonious theory that can both
explain all existing data and yield testable new hypotheses.
In contrast, legal actors are more agnostic about whether and to what extent
certainty and simplicity are virtues in law. For practicing lawyers, it all
75. This access is subject to the increasingly rigid constraints of standing doctrine. E.g., Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
76. KUHN, supra note 12.
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depends on their clients' interests, which may militate in favor of certainty on
one issue, uncertainty on another, and a shifting balance over time on a third.
For judges, it depends on how they balance various goals of the legal system-
for example, the competing policies of having clear rules and of responding
flexibly to equitable considerations in individual cases. Legislators and bureau-
crats, who also face countervailing incentives, will tend to favor legal complex-
ity and uncertainty because it helps them both to resolve intricate political and
policy disputes and to develop special expertise that confers autonomy,
prestige, and power over decisions.77
The law is usually in much more of a hurry to decide than science is.
Ironically, however, law's findings, although less reliable and tested than those
of science, are treated as more final and authoritative. Law operates under
pressure to resolve particular disputes speedily and conclusively. Once it finds
facts (and confirms them on appeal), those findings are considered res
judicata-final for the law's purposes, however erroneous they may be in fact.
Science, in contrast, seeks to develop a professional consensus on the truth of
its propositions. This consensus often takes a long time to assemble, yet even
then it is conditional, always open to revision on the basis of new data or
theories."
Richard Cooper, a former general counsel of the FDA, has analogized
cross-examination in the courtroom to peer review in the scientific journal,
noting that cross-examination is simply a more concentrated form of review
suitable to the law's more hurried, arbitrary pace.7 9 Many scientists,
however, would surely reject any analogy between scrupulous peer review and
what they view as the truth-obscuring manipulations and tricks of the
interrogating attorneys. Most scientists would probably also be dubious about
permitting juries to hear and rely upon scientific evidence that has not
previously been published in a peer-reviewed professional journal-an issue
raised by a Bendectin case pending before the U.S. Supreme Court. 0
The legal culture, of course, is hardly indifferent to the dangers of making
premature decisions on the basis of incomplete information. Judges fashion
many legal principles-for example, procedural rules allocating evidentiary
burdens," and substantive rules defining the legal consequences of knowledge
77. For a detailed discussion of this point, see Peter Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes,
Consequences, and Cures, 42 DuKE L.J. 1, 27-31 (1992).
78. As Michael Green puts it, "[tihe notion of refusing to reconsider a determination that one knows
is wrong would drive scientists even wilder than trotting out the concept of justice." Letter from Michael
D. Green to Peter H. Schuck, supra note 22.
79. Richard M. Cooper, Scientists and Lawyers in the Legal Process, 36 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J.
9, 19 (1981).
80. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted,
113 S. Ct. 320 (Oct. 13, 1992) (No. 92-102).
81. See, e.g., 9 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2509 (Chadhourn rev.
1981) (discussing res ipsa loquitur doctrine).
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and ignorance 82-in order to create incentives to produce, use, and dis-
seminate information that policymakers may need. Agencies and legislatures
also seek to stimulate new information that can help to solve legal problems.83
Nevertheless, judges are obliged to adjudicate the disputes that come before
them promptly and on the basis of the best evidence that can then be adduced,
even if that evidence seems wholly inadequate to support a scientific claim."
Judges do not ordinarily have the luxury of deferring a decision until additional
studies are conducted, the data are more conclusive, and a firm scientific
consensus is reached. Instead, they must decide on the basis of uncertain,
incomplete evidence, a circumstance that Cooper likens to "a jury verdict
reached midway during a trial. "85 The law's demand for an immediate resolu-
tion of disputes, he observes, may force it "to choose among competing
scientific theories, a choice that legal decision-makers are not competent to
make, and that scientists are not ready to make." 6 Although agencies usually
enjoy greater control over their dockets and decision priorities than do courts,
they too are under considerable compulsion-occasionally judicial, sometimes
legislative, often political-to act promptly despite data gaps that would dismay
a research scientist and implementation gaps that would astonish an engineer.
I have already noted the central importance of peer review in science. Peer
review is much more peripheral to lawyers, however, and the structure of
incentives that shapes their behavior reflect its marginality. Lawyers are hardly
indifferent to their reputations among fellow lawyers; client referrals as well
as professional recognition and pride are at stake. Moreover, the institution
of appellate review is a kind of peer-administered control structure. But the
legal culture has not developed peer review systems genuinely analogous to
science's refereed journals, grant review committees, and academic appoint-
ments processes. Law's highly competitive, public-oriented, adversary system
contributes to this difference. Scientists participate in a truly global community
of peers, yet they may achieve world renown (even Nobel Prizes) by impress-
ing a very small set of experts in a narrow sub-specialty with their quiet,
82. E.g., Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 546-49 (N.J. 1982) (striking state-
of-the-art defense in asbestos cases); Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374, 386 (N.J. 1984) (limiting
Beshada), rev'd on other grounds, 592 A.2d 1176 (N.J. 1991).
83. One method the legislatures and agencies have used to address these legal problems is "technology-
forcing" statutes and regulations. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY
Am 101 (1981). Standard-setting agencies may force development of new technologies where costs of
compliance with a new standard would be exceedingly high using existing technologies or where compliance
is simply infeasible using current technologies. Examples of such technology-forcing regulations include
OSHA's standards for occupational exposure to vinyl chloride, coke oven emissions, lead, and cotton dust.
See James C. Robinson & Dalton G. Paxman, Technological, Economic, and Political Feasibilityin OSHA's
Air Contaminants Standard, 16 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 1, 6-7 (1991). Courts have generally upheld
these technology-forcing methods. See Huber, supra note 17, at 1060-62.
84. See, e.g., Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1534-35 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
85. Cooper, supra note 79, at 25.
86. Id.
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painstaking, imaginative work. Lawyers' reputations, in contrast, depend on
a more localized notoriety among less sophisticated audiences dominated by
lay clients with largely economic interests. More than in science, the legal
culture (or at least a good part of it) richly rewards combativeness, self-promo-
tion, and an aggressive, vivid personality-although these qualities are by not
means unknown among top scientists.
The incentive structures in science and law, however, do not simply reflect
their different client orientations, attitudes toward complexity and uncertainty,
and peer review systems. They also reflect differences in how the two cultures
are organized and financed. While the number of scientific investigators is
quite large, science is administered predominantly through a relatively
"clustered" structure consisting of a comparatively small number of leading
universities, research institutes, and corporations. Within this structure,
considerable coordination occurs through sub-specialty journals, professional
conferences, and the funding decisions of a limited number of sources.
Legal activity is not nearly so coordinated. Hundreds of thousands of
lawyers act daily on behalf of millions of clients. They make claims and deploy
arguments that are utterly fragmented except insofar as the law provides clear
rules or unambiguous principles of decision, and not simply a conventional
rhetoric of rights. Formal legal institutions such as legislatures, courts, and
agencies do provide some coordination and guidance to lawyers, their clients,
and others. In some respects, however, these institutions simply increase the
chaos; they too are radically decentralized (within both the federal system and
each state system). Their pronouncements are often susceptible to competing
interpretations, and they provide multiple access and decision points for any
legal actors who are dissatisfied with one or another interpretation.
3. Biases and Orientations
Law, like science, has its characteristic blind spots and preoccupations. The
differences between the two cultures in this respect are fortified by their
members' distinctive training. Scientific education is largely didactic and
constructive; it emphasizes the transmission of information, the techniques of
theory-building, and the modes of empirical investigation. Legal education,
in contrast, is essentially deconstructive and dialogic; it emphasizes the
malleability of facts, the plasticity of legal doctrine, the indeterminacy of legal
texts, and the power of rhetorical skill. Decades after specialty and
subspecialty training became common for doctors, moreover, lawyers continue
to be trained and practice as generalists. Their mere admission to the bar
usually entitles them to practice law in any field they like with no legal
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requirement for specialty certification.87 Most American judges are also
generalists not only because of the nature of their legal education but also
because of the general jurisdiction of their courts. Indeed, unlike their
colleagues in civil law countries, they receive no special training to be profes-
sional judges. The legal culture exhorts both judges and ordinary lawyers to
have a broad, synthetic, social vision rather than a narrow, insular, technocrat-
ic one.
On the other hand, lawyers' central role in the adversary system can foster
a kind of truculent tendentiousness that can encourage them to take frivolous
positions, overlook or obscure complexities, and give short shrift to other
points of view. They can do so with the easy conscience of advocates who
confidently assume that any extreme claims they make will be countered by
others no less extreme and will then be resolved by judges who understand this
exercise in hyperbole and routinely make allowances for it. Their professional
penchant for advocacy and rhetoric, intensified by the financial interest that
many have in disputes and litigation, often promotes conflict rather than
resolving it. Commentators have noted that the adversary process is far better
at deconstructing scientific claims than at reconstructing "the communally held
beliefs that reasonably pass for truth in science. "" Few scientists feel
comfortable in this contentious milieu. Most find it particularly repugnant both
as an intellectual process for seeking truth and as a matter of personal and
professional style.8 9
Finally, the fact that law is both authoritative and suppletive-that it both
legitimates official actions and facilitates private ones-creates other biases.
Because much law must be predicted, understood, and applied by many
ordinary people with limited resources, simplicity is often a compelling legal
virtue. Law cannot afford to be as nuanced as the realities it seeks to shape;'*
it necessarily draws lines and creates categories that force many legal decisions
into a binary mold; one is either in or out of the category, and it matters a
great deal which.9"
This rather arbitrary binary classification, so characteristic of legal thought
and so evident in the Bendectin and Agent Orange cases, is utterly alien to
science. Where the practicing lawyer or judge speaks casually of chemical A
being (or not being) a carcinogen, or of action B having "caused" condition C,
87. 1 am aware of one limited exception. In order to prosecute a patent claim before the Patent Office,
one must be certified as a specialist. 37 C.F.R. § 10.10 (1988). This requirement, however, does not apply
to the litigation of patent claims in the courts.
88. See Jasanoff, supra note 46, at 353; see also Sanders, supra note 20, at 44.
89. See, e.g., Sanders, supra note 20, at 30.
90. See generally Schuck, supra note 77.
91. Thus a defendant is either guilty or not guilty, negligent or not, in breach of the contract or statute
or in compliance with it. One's agent is either a servant or an independent contractor. The court either has
jurisdiction over a case or lacks it. The will is either valid or invalid. The AFDC claimant is either eligible
for the benefit or she is ineligible.
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the careful scientist is much more circumspect. To her, causal relationships
are only stochastic predictions, not categorical facts. In science, the goal is not
to facilitate socially useful action at low cost, as it sometimes is in law, but
instead to understand the world in all its complexity. For science, theoretical
simplification-the slice of Ockham's Razor 92-is not a condition of norma-
tivity but merely one technique for deepening and extending this understanding.
In part (but only in part), this tendency toward categorical reductionism
in the law reflects its commitment to the jury as a lay decision-maker in many
disputes. In no other legal system in the world does the jury play so large a
legal and political role.93 Invoking populist premises, the legal culture depicts
it as the embodiment of common sense and yeoman virtue; it institutionalizes
a mode of knowing, of which experts and other elites who suffer from "trained
incapacity" (in Philip Selznick's apt phrase) are thought to be incapable. Lay
jurors are often the triers of even complex facts,94 and much legal doctrine
enshrines the cognitive and behavioral standards of ordinary people (the "man
on the Clapham omnibus," in one formulation)," rather than expert stan-
dards, as the test of legally approved conduct. Finally, the jury affirms populist
values by exercising certain political functions, serving as the voice of common
morality, a bulwark of common liberty, and a decentralized organ of popular
government, one that is constantly refreshed.96 The jury thus reflects the legal
culture's singular compromise between professional autonomy, which in
science counts for everything, and popular sovereignty, which in science
counts for little (but trouble).97
92. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1501 (1976) ("the philosophic rule that
entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily").
93. See generally Peter H. Schuck, Mapping the Debate on Jury Reform, in THE VERDICT ch. 9
(Robert E. Litan & Marc Whitehead eds., forthcoming 1993).
94. Indeed, juries are still constitutionally permitted to decide questions of law in Maryland and
Indiana. See VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 157 (1986).
Judges, the other triers of fact, also reflect populist values to some extent. In many states, they are
selected by political parties and voters, not by their professional peers. Mary T. Wickham, Note, Mapping
the Morass: Application of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to Judicial Elections, 33 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1251, 1252 & n.14 (1991) (listing jurisdictions that elect their judges).
95. Hall v. Brooklands Auto Racing Club, 1 K.B. 205, 224 (1933).
96. For reflections on how well the civil jury fulfills these expectations, see generally the contributions
in THE VERDICT, supra note 93. On the jury's political functions, see Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights
as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991).
97. This formulation is too cute. It is not meant to suggest, of course, that scientists are not committed
to democratic values, or that science could continue to thrive in the absence of political freedom or broad
public support. 1 mean only that science qua science-as a culture that investigates the world in a particular
way-does not depend on popular sovereignty, and that a militant populism often threatens it. For science,
any political system permitting genuinely free inquiry will do.
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C. Politics
Politics, the pursuit and exercise of the coercive, prescriptive, and symbolic
powers of the state, lies near the core of all social life, appearing in many
forms and venues. Here, I am principally interested in how politicians
approach those public policies whose legitimacy draws heavily on scientific
authority and on scientific propositions about the natural world. As noted
earlier, my paradigmatic examples are regulation of the safety of foods, drugs,
consumer products, the environment, and the workplace.9
Politics relates symbiotically to both science and law but in different ways.
Science has its own politics, often fierce and bitter, in which scientists pursue
power, recognition, and resources from the government, the profession, and
other sources.9 9 Just as scientists often play politics, politicians also have
many opportunities to exploit the prestige and symbols of science in order to
fortify their empirical claims, legitimate and build public support for their
decisions, and clothe themselves in the mantle of scientific truth.
1. Central Values
Like all cultures, politics pursues a mix of values some of which are unique
to its particular way of life."° In a liberal democratic polity like ours, which
purports not to privilege particular visions of the good, these are chiefly
process values, although they are deployed in pursuit of substantive ends.
Three of these process values seem paramount. The participation norm holds
that individuals should be empowered, in the interest of human dignity, to play
some meaningful role in shaping decisions that affect their vital interests. The
accountability norm demands that officials be held politically responsible to
the public for their actions. The conflict management norm emphasizes that
other values can be achieved only if social conflicts are kept within tolerable
limits.
98. Supra text accompanying notes 9-10.
99. See, e.g., JAMES D. WATSON, THE DOUBLE HELIX: A PERSONAL ACCOUNT OF THE DISCOVERY
OF THE STRUCTURE OF DNA (1980). The fight between the United States team led by Robert Gallo and
the French team led by Luc Montagnier for recognition as the first to identify the virus that causes AIDS,
further exemplifies the politics involved in scientific research. See Marlene Cimons, Bad Blood; Two
Groups ofAIDS Researchers-One American, One French-Are Fighting More Than Just the Disease, L.A.
TIMES MAG., May 25, 1986, at 16.
100. This contradicts the assertion by one commentator (who, as a federal judge, should know better)
that "[s]cience and law are all we have." Howard T. Markey, Science and Law: The Friendly Enemies,
30 IDEA 13 (1989).
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2. Incentives and Techniques
These values engender an equally distinctive set of political incentives and
decision techniques. Virtually all academic models of politics, as well as many
less systematic commentaries, posit that politicians are primarily, if not
exclusively, driven by the need to build and maintain a winning electoral
coalition. No sophisticated political analyst, of course, doubts either that most
politicians' definition of the winning coalition is complex enough to accommo-
date other personal and ideological goals which they possess, or that politicians
sometimes take positions on issues that cannot easily be explained simply in
terms of conventional calculations of electoral advantage. But even when the
electoral imperative is narrowly conceived, it explains their actions better than
any other single factor.
From this preoccupation with election, certain behavioral strategies follow,
most of which'"' sharply differentiate the political culture from the scientific
and legal ones. One important difference relates to the cultures' audiences and
thus to the form of discourse that is possible. Unlike scientists and judges, who
mainly address their professional colleagues and can employ technical and
theoretical kinds of arguments, politicians speak to a lay and largely
uninformed electorate. Often, they can only reach the voters through media
that, while sometimes more sophisticated than the voters, are also severely
constrained by the voters' limitations of time, understanding, and interest.
Instead of the nuanced, abstract arguments deployed in the scientific and
legal cultures, then, political rhetoric is relatively crude and particularistic.
Where both scientific and legal discourses are designed to pursue truth through
the elaboration of principles, the point of political discourse ultimately is to
persuade. Rhetorical strategies that would be professionally unacceptable in
science and often in law-explicit appeals to sentiment, ideology, or interest-
are standard tactics in politics, where the " mobilization of bias" is both normal
and normative.
0 2
In addition to a distinctive audience and rhetoric, politics has its own time
horizon. Especially when compared to science, but even when contrasted with
law, political decisions tend to be spasmodic and impulsive. They are shaped
by deadlines that seem highly arbitrary from almost any other perspective-
101. Most, but not all. Credit-claiming, for example, pervades each of the three cultures, although
not in the same way and to the same extent. Politicians, the quintessential entrepreneurs, trumpet their
virtues to the public without reserve or shame. Scientists, more tempered by the professional dictates of
collaboration, peer review, and caution, are more circumspect. They must seek to burnish their reputations
with peers and funding agencies, yet, they are wary of premature claims that can be decisively discredited.
Lawyers and judges are constrained by ethical canons from conventional advertising, so they avidly seek
(and find) imaginative alternative forms of self-promotion.
102. E.E. SCHAITSCHNEIDER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PEOPLE 29-30 (1960) (asserting that political
interest groups are themselves "a mobilization of bias in preparation for action") (emphasis omitted).
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especially that of a scientific model of decision making in which evidence is
gathered, alternative hypotheses are considered, and a deliberate, rational
judgment is reached. The political culture often demands swift action, and
when it does it will not tolerate delay, even if prudence might counsel other-
wise. The pace of mass democratic politics is driven by the insistent rhythm
of public opinion, which will not be temporized.
Another distinction of the political culture relates not to discursive method
but to decisional technique. In theory and largely in fact, scientific hypotheses
are confirmed or refuted by experimentation, and judicial rulings proceed by
reasoned elaboration of established principles."i3 In contrast, the paradigmatic
decision technique in liberal democratic politics is bargaining to a consen-
sus, 104 a process that is complex, amorphous, and continuous. Numerous
participants form constantly shifting alliances and deploy a fluid mixture of
rewards, threats, special interest claims, public interest ideals, and evocative
symbols. Because the process is so open-ended in time, participation, and
issue-space, political outcomes are not merely unpredictable; they are also
opaque and hard to identify. Even the enactment of legislation, itself a protract-
ed affair, is only a shadowy guide to what it will become. Its meaning will
depend upon its future implementation.
These defining features of political behavior shape the criteria for evaluat-
ing that behavior. Political bargains can be criticized on a variety of procedural
and substantive grounds. But the complaint that an outcome is inconsistent with
earlier ones, which often will be a decisive objection in science and law,
carries far less weight in the political culture. In the political environment,
change is an effective rallying cry, flexibility is a crucial resource, and policy
innovation is a desideratum. Inconsistency in politics is as likely to be an asset
as a liability. By the same token, the complaint that a political decision lacks
strong empirical support is also often beside the point. Such evidence may be
unavailable when the decision must be made, or if it is available, may well be
subject to controversial, normatively charged interpretations. Even beyond this,
constitutional principles do not ordinarily prevent a legislature from deciding
103. Actually, even legal realists recognize that most cases are easy for courts to resolve. See, e.g.,
BENJAMIN N. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 164 (1921) (stating that in a majority
of cases, legal precedent mandates a single outcome).
104. In this respect, politics resembles the decentralized, competitive character of markets, but one
should not exaggerate the similarities. Although politics and markets are highly interdependent-market
forces shape political competition, and vice versa-they organize and justify their decisions in altogether
different ways. Additionally, their goals, techniques, and ideology also differ. There are pervasive, endemic
tensions between a centralized, aggregative, cooperative system of political power and resource allocation
and a fragmented, individualistic, competitive market system. ROBERT A. DAHL & CHARLES E. LINDBLOM,
POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND WELFARE: PLANNING AND POLrIco-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS RESOLVED INTO
BASIC SOCIAL PROCESSES (1953); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES (1975).
In contrast, the structures of science and law are more similar to market structures. Like markets,
science and law are each driven by intense competition among decentralized decision-makers animated in
part by private goals and a broader public interest in productive efficiency.
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against the weight of the evidence; in most policy areas, any "rational basis"-
even one hypothesized by the reviewing court-will suffice. 05
3. Biases and Orientations
As these last observations suggest, politics also has its characteristic blind
spots. A notable one is its abhorrence of firm principle. This, of course, is
seldom publicly acknowledged as such; instead, it is portrayed and celebrated
as a benign commitment to consensus and compromise. We can better under-
stand this bias by comparing it with how firm principle is treated in science
and law.
Science, by its very nature, demands that its practitioners rigorously
observe certain canons of investigation and verification, and that they accept,
or at least respect, its substantive principles until they can disprove them.
Legal principles, while not verifiable in any scientific (or other) sense, are also
treated as presumptively binding. In law's normative hierarchy, they govern
conduct unless and until they are contradicted by other principles of an equal
or higher dignity.
In the political culture, however, compromise of principle is not merely
inevitable and habitual; it is also normative. A successful practitioner of
politics must possess both a taste and a talent for compromise. House Speaker
Sam Rayburn's well-known advice to the novice-"if you want to get along,
go along"-remains a fundamental precept of the politician's creed. Many
politicians, of course, do not view compromise as an abandonment of principle
but instead justify it as simply a tactic employed in the service of a larger
principled strategy, much as a sailboat caught in an unfavorable wind must tack
back and forth in order to reach its destination. Doubtless this is often true.
But however one views this conduct, the result is much the same: compromise
of principle is essential to the profession of politics.
Another distinctive bias of politics is its populism-its appeal to the
superior virtues of common people. We have already seen that this populism
is anathema to science. The legal culture's use of the jury and the veneration
of its findings, as well as the election of many judges, manifest a limited but
important commitment to populism. Though law is more populist than science,
politics is even more populist than law. In law, expertise is often privileged.
For example, qualified expert witnesses may offer opinion testimony in many
circumstances in which lay witnesses may not. " Scientific treatises and
other authoritative works may be admitted under an exception to the hearsay
105. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961) ("statutory discrimination will not be set aside
if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it").
106. Compare FED. R. EviD. 701 with FED. R. EVID. 702.
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rule."0 7 Professional custom constitutes the standard of care in malpractice
cases, and the business judgment rule governs most corporate transactions.
Judges are obliged to set aside those jury verdicts that they deem irrational or
contrary to the weight of the evidence.
Our political culture embraces many of the populist premises that science
and to a lesser degree law repudiate. It maintains the principle that the
legitimacy of public decisions must rest primarily upon bases other than the
professional status, esoteric knowledge, or special expertise of the decision-
maker. This principle applies regardless of whether the decision-maker is a
regulatory bureaucracy, corporation, or individual official. 10 8 It affirms that
however much technocracy can contribute to public deliberations, the popular
will is the ultimate touchstone of policy. It insists, sometimes to the point of
outright pandering, that the people know best even when it is clear that they
do not. This principle goes well beyond a grudging, realistic recognition that
in a democracy the voters have the last word; it is also fundamentally norma-
tive. It elevates the wisdom of popular judgments, their superiority to those
of the experts, and the independent integrity of the political process, to the
level of central articles of the democratic faith.
Although it is not inaccurate to speak of a political culture, as I have done,
it is also useful for certain purposes to differentiate broadly between two
political subcultures: elected officials and their political appointees, on the one
hand, and the career civil service, especially in its lower, more technical
reaches, on the other. I characterized these two groups earlier as "political"
and "expert" bureaucrats-a crude but serviceable distinction. 1"9 In terms
of their attitudes toward lay participation in decision making, political bureau-
crats, whom democratic theory supposes to be exquisitely responsive to
electoral concerns, lie near the lay decision-making end of the spectrum, far
from science. The expert bureaucrats lie closer to the professional autonomy
pole; their fidelity to programmatic clients, bureaucratic traditions, and profes-
sional canons competes with the norms of hierarchical authority and respon-
siveness to the electorate.l1 °
Both of the political biases which I have noted-aversion to principle, and
obeisance to populism-are visibly at work in the Agent Orange and (to a
lesser extent) Bendectin cases. While scientific principles eventually proved
capable of resolving these cases to most toxicologists' satisfaction, these
107. FED. R. EvtD. 803(18).
108. Populist politics, of course, reflects many factors, including our democratic institutions, our
Horatio Algermyth of individualism, and our anti-hierarchical, anti-authoritarian, anti-intellectualtraditions.
See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN AMERICAN LIFE (1963).
109. See supra text accompanying notes 55-56.
110. E.g., William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J.
1198 (1983); Gary J. Greenberg, Revolt at Justice, in INSIDE THE SYSTEM 105, 195-210 (Charles Peters
& Timothy J. Adams eds., 1970).
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principles bore less dignity in the political world where lay judgments often
dominate professional ones. In Congress, where populism routinely trumps
science and rewrites the law, neither the scientific fact that Agent Orange did
not harm the veterans nor the legal conclusion that this denied them any right
to compensation was decisive. In the Bendectin cases, the sequence of events
made politics' subordination of scientific values less salient. Some politicians
rebuked the FDA's scientist-bureaucrats for overriding lay jurors' populist
wisdom in the early cases, but the manufacturer's withdrawal of the drug from
the market in 1983 quickly mooted the point.
III. LOOKING AHEAD
Multi-cultural conflicts among the legal, political, and scientific cultures
should not be a cause for regret. They are not only inevitable, but they serve
essential social functions. They raise certain competing interests to the level
of public consciousness and debate, which no wise polity can afford either to
suppress or to ignore. They encourage social innovation and policy flexibility
by infusing the polity with a varied array of legitimating norms and problem-
solving techniques, making it difficult for any single world-view to always
dominate. They also increase and refine our stock of social information,
supplying policymakers with values, ideology, imagery, and problem-solving
techniques whose diversity makes them all the more valuable. No single
culture, moreover, can possibly mobilize all of these social resources all of
the time. For example, the scientific ethos, which gained sway during the New
Deal period, yielded some ground to the participatory politics of the Great
Society, which in turn led to the more demanding legal controls of the late
1960s and early 70s. 1' In the 1980s we reached a more fluid, transitional
stage, which recognized the values of all three cultures to some degree but in
which none was clearly ascendant.
As the Bendectin and Agent Orange cases illustrate, the mix of values
necessary to resolving multi-cultural conflicts is not fixed but changes over
time. Moreover, the cultures interact in complex, often unexpected, ways. In
the Bendectin cases, for example, scientific values came to dominate purely
legal ones after the mid-1980s, as the scientific evidence in support of the
drug's safety grew steadily more conclusive and the courts became more
uneasy about permitting juries to exercise their legally sanctioned power to
deviate from that conclusion in individual cases. In the Agent Orange cases,
Congress infused new political values into an earlier legal-scientific consensus
111. Clearly, changing partisan divisions within the federal government also had a great deal to do
with these cycles, but this hardly refutes my observation, since the political parties differed with respect
to the weight that should be accorded to different cultures' values and decisions.
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when it decided to compensate veterans whose injuries the court had found,
relying on the best available science, to be insufficiently linked to the herbi-
cide. In that litigation's intricate blend of science, law, and politics, each
culture insisted on its own centrality while opportunistically borrowing values
from the others.
This cultural eclecticism was most evident on the causation issue.
Organized groups-the chemical industry, the veterans, and the U.S. govern-
ment-recruited scientists to buttress their political and legal interests. The
scientists were then obliged to set their cultural norms of discourse and proof
to one side as they had to testify in the less scientific terms-for example,
"more probable than not"-that the legal rules demanded. The lawyers, while
mobilizing scientific data and methodology in the form of expert testimony,
also looked to politicians and bureaucrats to help resolve the dispute. The
politicians and bureaucrats, for their part, funded epidemiological studies and
paid their verbal respects to the scientific evidence, then awarded veterans
benefits with little regard to its findings.
These cases demonstrate that in the fluid worlds of politics and policy-
making, the relevant cultural boundaries are poorly marked and evanescent,
so much so that we constantly cross them without even knowing it. We may
find it expedient to draw careful lines in order to preserve for each a core
domain, a clearly defined jurisdiction within which each culture's special
values and procedures can govern. While I suggest some line-drawing criteria
below, the fact is that the most interesting and important conflicts, such as
those in the Agent Orange cases, will occur near the cultures' peripheries
where these domains touch and begin to overlap, and where the optimal mix
remains highly uncertain.
We have seen that many questions that society poses to science are really
"trans-scientific" in nature.112 In the same way, other questions that we dele-
gate to politicians and to judges are trans-political and trans-legal, respectively.
But although cultural boundaries will become more permeable as society grows
more complex and undertakes more ambitious goals, we must not conclude
reductively that these boundaries are simply formal constructions that we can
safely ignore or transgress. Notwithstanding their permeability, science, law,
and politics remain coherent cultures. When one of them addresses a question
that it is normatively and technically competent to answer, and does so through
a process that conforms to its distinctive competencies, society should strongly
presume that its answers are valid and legitimate, and those challenging them
should bear a very heavy burden of proof.
What, then, are the contours of each culture's appropriate sphere? Which
issues is each competent to decide? Here, the conventional concepts of core
112. See supra text accompanying note 37.
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and periphery are helpful, though not decisive in the hard cases. Setting
epistemological quibbles to one side, some issues may be said to be (or treated
as if they were) scientific, legal, or political at their core, although not at their
periphery. Because a cultural sphere's contours are not self-defining or
immanent but are instead shaped by evolving social values, purposes, and
perceptions of appropriateness, the domains of core and periphery shift over
time and in different contexts.
Consider some examples. The operation of clinical testing laboratories was
long-treated as a matter within the core of scientific activity. Social concerns
about rising health care costs and incompetent diagnoses, however, moved
clinical laboratories out toward the periphery of science where they overlap
with law and politics, which now subject them to extensive regulation.
Occasionally the movement is in the other direction. Recombinant DNA
research, a controversial political topic during the 1970s, was originally
subjected to strict legal controls. As its benefits became more apparent and its
risks all but vanished, however, DNA research gravitated to the legal and
political peripheries and beyond. Shedding the earlier controls, it entered the
realm of essentially unrestricted science.
As these examples suggest, the three cultures commonly converge at their
peripheries when confronted with a multi-cultural issue. This convergence
demands a complex decision-making structure that can somehow integrate the
values of several conflicting cultures in pursuit of a satisfactory, if often
contingent, resolution. It must negotiate the relative weights of the conflicting
values in a more or less ad hoc fashion since they ordinarily cannot be
specified in advance. Such a system is inevitably messy and to some degree
indeterminate, but this is a condition of liberal-democratic-technocratic society
that we simply must learn to live with and manage better.
While recognizing that the power to characterize issues as scientific, legal,
or political is often the power to determine who will decide them and what the
ultimate outcome will be, this allocation should be relatively unproblematic
where an issue lies at a culture's core, that is, where it involves a quint-
essentially scientific, legal, or political question.'
Nevertheless, current legal arrangements often confound such an allocation
even in the clearest core cases. The central question in the Bendectin cases-
whether and under what circumstances the drug causes birth defects when
taken during pregnancy-is scientific at its core, in at least the following four
senses. First, it is a question about a factual relationship, with few "value"
elements. Second, the scientific community has reached a consensus on how
this question should be formulated, which methodologies are appropriate for
113. Multi-cultural issues, of course, do not come to us neatly and objectively labeled; indeed, the
labels are themselves social constructions whose meanings are contingent upon how people succeed in
deploying them. See supra note 46 and text accompanying notes 50-51.
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answering it, and what counts as evidence. Third, no objective person-
scientist, lawyer, or politician-really believes that this answer should turn on
who asks the question or who administers the experiments. Finally, neither law
nor politics seriously disputes that this is indeed a scientific issue in all of these
senses.
Some, however, will view even these propositions as socially constructed
conventions rather than as objective truths. The propositions are not self-
evident; they raise hard questions that deserve-and in the sociology and
history of science are receiving-serious responses. 1 ' For example, what
is a "fact"? Who belongs to the "scientific community"? Is its self-constituting
character an invitation to narrow-mindedness or even corruption? Who gets
to decide these questions? Questions like these, which emphasize the social
constructedness, contingency, and political pedigree of ostensibly scientific
facts, are important cautions against adopting what Sheila Jasanoff calls "a
naively positivist image of science."" 5
These questions can lead to valuable insights. But we should not carry their
logic so far as to preclude rational, coherent discourse about science-or
indeed about any other salient social practice that needs to be better under-
stood. If the necessary terms of discourse are themselves contingent social
constructs that are devoid of intelligible meaning, then rational discourse
becomes impossible. We place ourselves in an infinite regress culminating in
analytical inconclusiveness and prescriptive paralysis. This frustrating prospect,
of course, cannot refute the social constructedness of science; that a conclusion
is dismal does not mean that it is wrong. It should encourage us, however, to
search for other strategies, even though they are imperfect."
6
Two pragmatic considerations further justify viewing the causal issue in
the Bendectin cases as a core scientific one. First, even if the propositions
supporting this view are merely social conventions, they are so widely accepted
as to be canonical. Indeed, if Bendectin's causation is not a scientific question,
it is difficult to imagine one that is. Second, society has made remarkable
material progress by treating such issues precisely as if they were scientific
at their core to view science as essentially an epiphenomenon of politics and
law would be to place these gains (and future ones) in serious jeopardy.
I have argued that a core scientific issue like causation should be authorita-
tively decided within the scientific culture by institutions that this culture
designates as appropriate to the task, subject only to controls (such as judicial
review) that are designed to advance, or at least are consistent with, the
114. Id.
115. See Jasanoff, supra note 46, at 356.
116. In this connection it seems revealing that Professor Jasanoff, a sophisticated expositor of the
sociology of science view, employs terms like "science" and "scientist" as if they possessed some core,
objective meaning not altogether contingent upon the speaker's idiosyncratic conceptions. Id. passin
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particular cultural values in question (such as factual accuracy). In the
Bendectin cases and many others like it, the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) is that institution.
This is not to say, of course, that the FDA fully instantiates the scientific
ideal. Criticism of that agency for being unduly influenced by regulated firms
and for lacking sufficient technical expertise and enforcement resources has
long been a staple of American regulatory politics. But this cannot be a
decisive consideration, for in our system the same is true of virtually all
government institutions. For better or for worse, the FDA is the agency that
the public has empowered to make authoritative judgments of this kind on its
behalf. In recent years, moreover, its technical and enforcement resources have
been significantly enhanced due in part to its uncommonly strong leadership.
Its counterparts in Europe receive a level of deference from their publics and
courts that no American agency is likely to enjoy; the more competitive,
fragmented, populist character of our politics assures that even technical
agency decisions will be vigorously contested."17 Nevertheless, we should
strive to justify greater public and judicial deference both by strengthening the
agency's scientific base and by increasing the authoritativeness of its decisions
for juries in tort cases.
In Bendectin, however, well-settled legal principles prevented the court
from according any greater deference to the FDA's finding on the causation
question than to an individual's (or a juror's) flip of a coin. As I and others
have argued elsewhere, it is hard to justify this repudiation of the cultural
competence principle,"' which is rather like permitting English majors to
authoritatively answer complex physics problems on which important social
consequences turn. If they get it right, it is purely by accident.
The cultural competence norm should be equally decisive in the political
and legal cultures. In order to maintain the integrity and patrol the boundaries
of the political culture against unwarranted intrusions by law, the courts have
adopted certain self-denying principles and stratagems-for example, the
political question doctrine".9 and the so-called "passive virtues.""' These
safeguards, however, are notoriously weak; courts, both "liberal" and "conser-
vative," commonly breach such boundaries. As for core legal issues, few if
any would exist in a purely democratic, majoritarian polity, where all issues
117. See supra note 42.
118. See, e.g., SCHUCK, supra note 30, at 291.
119. See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993); Steven L. Carter, From Sick Chicken
to Synar: The Evolution and Subsequent De-Evolution of the Separation of Powers, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REV.
719; Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial Regulation of Politics,
87 COLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1377-84 (1987).
120. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS (1962). The classic response to Bickel is found in Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of
the "Passive Virtues "-A Comment on Principles and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV.
1 (1964).
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are subject to political resolution. Liberal constitutionalism, however, carves
out a significant legal core by placing certain activities, such as speech, beyond
the reach of politics, and by barring governmental actions, such as bills of
attainder, that lack sufficient generality to control legislative abuse.'
I have noted, however, that the most interesting multi-cultural issues-
especially conflicts between science and law-lie not at the core of one culture
but near the periphery of several. Here, the problem is not to allocate the issue
to one culture and then protect its decisional autonomy and integrity, but rather
to ensure that the culture with ultimate decisional authority infuses into its
decision process the relevant values of the other cultures. Thoughtful, imagina-
tive scholars have advanced and carefully dissected many interesting proposals
for accomplishing this integration with respect to science-law conflicts. Since
it would be idle for me to rehearse these proposals, I shall simply group the
various approaches.
Administrative law. Many of the administrative law innovations since the
1960s have been designed to assimilate diverse cultural values into the decision
process of agencies. These include increased rule-making, broadened participa-
tion and hearing rights, heightened judicial review, greater access to
information and to the decision process, technical advisory groups, and the
like. 1
22
Expert testimony. Another approach to reform emphasizes the manner in
which scientific evidence is not only discovered and prepared, but also present-
ed to and constraining of the trier of fact (usually a jury). Such proposals
usually involve some alteration in the form, timing, neutrality, sponsorship,
screening, criticism, or review of expert testimony. " The Supreme Court
is now considering (in a Bendectin case) one such proposal: the revival of the
121. An example is the kind of legislative veto invalidated by the Supreme Court in INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919 (1983). There, Congress exercised the power to reverse a quintessentially legal decision,
one that adjudicated the legal rights of a lone individual whose personal liberty was being infringed upon
by the government. This is a paradigmatic instance in which our constitutional tradition of due process
proscribes politics from invading the adjudicatory function.
122. See generally STEPHEN G. BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES (3d ed. 1992). Unfortunately, some of these
administrative law innovations have not been successful. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier,
Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1027, 1061-99 (1990) (arguing that proposals to increase
the scope of agency authority at the expense of judicial scrutiny are premature); Jerry L. Mashaw,
Improving the Environment of Agency Rulemaking: An Essay on Management, Games, and Legal and
Political Accountability, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 1993).
123. E.g., Gross, supra note 23, at 1208-30; Richard Marcus, Discovery Along the Litigation/Science
Interface, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 381 (1991); see E. Donald Elliott, Toward Incentive-Based Procedure: Three
Approaches for Regulating Scientific Evidence, 69 B.U. L. REV. 487 (1989); E. Donald Elliott, The Future
of Toxic Torts: Of Chemophobia, Risk as a Compensable Injury, and Hybrid Compensation Systems, 25
Hous. L. REV. 781 (1988); HUBER, supra note 20, ch. 11.
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so-called Frye standard for the admission of scientific evidence. 24 Another
proposal, advanced by John Monahan and Laurens Walker under the rubric
of "social frameworks," would authorize courts to instruct juries with respect
to established social scientific facts that recur from case to case (as in
Bendectin), much as they now instruct juries with respect to binding legal
principles. "
Trier offact. Other proposals are concerned with the nature and technical
qualifications of the entity that determines the facts in court litigation or
administrative regulation. They must address the different statuses that expert
and lay judgments enjoy in science and in law, differences which make it
difficult to agree upon a suitable composition, function, and control mechanism
for this entity. Such proposals usually advocate the use of specialized juries,
a new allocation of fact-finding duties between judge and jury, or some form
of "science court" or other expert tribunal. '26
Positivism. Another approach encourages scientists and judges to character-
ize and differentiate their decisions in a way that distinguishes sharply between
questions of fact and questions of value. The notion is that by isolating facts
and values and explicitly calling decision-makers' attention to this distinction,
decisions can be reviewed and legitimated in ways that are democratically and
technocratically appropriate to their epistemological nature.' 27
Cross-cultural understanding. The most uncontroversial proposal stresses
the importance of greater tolerance and acceptance of the diverse values and
perspectives that different cultures bring to the decision process. The notion
is that educating scientists, lawyers, and politicians about each other's value
systems and modes of thinking will enhance the quality and political accept-
ability of social decisions. In this spirit, exchange programs bring scientists
to Capitol Hill and executive branch agencies, while law students and political
science majors are encouraged to enroll in university science and technology
studies programs and to participate in interdisciplinary education. Judge
Howard Markey of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which
124. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted,
113 S. Ct. 320 (Oct. 13, 1992) (No. 92-102).
125. See generally JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS ch. 5 (2d ed. 1990).
126. E.g., James A. Martin, The Proposed "Science Court, * 75 MICH. L. REV. 1058 (1977); Stephen
Sugarman, The Need to Reform Personal Injury Law: Leaving Scientific Disputes to Scientists, 248 SCIENCE
823 (1990); Cooper, supra note 79; Milton R. Wessel, Science, Technology and the Law in America: A
Plea for Credibility in Dispute Resolution, 22 JURIMETRICS J. 245 (1981); see also Schuck, supra note 93.
127. E.g., David L. Bazelon, Science and Uncertainty: A Jurist's View, 5 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
209 (1981); COMMITTEE ON RISK & DECISION MAKING, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK AND
DECISION MAKING: PERSPECTIVES AND RESEARCH 31-34 (1982).
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handles patent, copyright, trademark, and other technical issues, is a typical
advocate of this strategy: "We need to think long and hard," he writes, "about
the future of a society as technologically oriented and as law-soaked as ours
when our scientists and lawyers cannot even talk to each other." 28
These approaches to managing multi-cultural issues all have the attractive
features emphasized by their proponents. Each, however, is also problematic
in important respects. While many of the ideas about opening up the adminis-
trative process to diverse interests have already been instituted, they have not
been notably successful. 129 Most expert testimony reforms threaten the deeply
embedded (though highly contestable) norms of the adversary system of proof.
Attempts to transform the trier-of-fact are likely to be political non-starters.
This is especially true of efforts to alter the jury, one of our legal system's
sacred cows, in the name of expertise, one of our political system's bete-
noirs."3° Positivist reforms rest upon a fact-value distinction that is both
controversial in principle and often objectionable in practice. A rigid, categori-
cal positivism is especially vulnerable when applied to policy approaches like
risk regulation, whose social authority rests heavily on political forms of
legitimation. 3' Even cross-cultural understanding, an obviously desirable
goal, risks sensitizing us to underlying normative differences without doing
much to resolve them. Indeed, emphasizing a culture's own distinctiveness may
actually reinforce its chauvinistic impulses and intensify cultural conflict. My
earlier analogy to heightened ethnic consciousness is hardly reassuring in this
regard.
Moreover, each of these remedial approaches (save the last) would collide
at the most fundamental level with certain structural, constitutional, and
normative features of our public law system. Competing governmental organs
institutionalize the three cultures in different degrees. Technocratic expertise,
the paradigmatic scientific value, is primarily the domain of executive branch
agencies, although Congress has sought greater technical parity in recent
years.132 Principled decision making is both a judicial and bureaucratic
128. Markey, supra note 100, at 18; see also Leon Rosenberg & Guido Calabresi, Law and Medicine,
32 YALE L. REP. 12 (1986) (dialogue between medical school and law school deans about effects of
malpractice litigation). Stephen Goldberg's proposal for "science counselors," who would help scientists
to be more sensitive to the social implications of their research and its applications, is a variant of this
approach. Goldberg, supra note 49, at 1379-87.
129. See supra note 121.
130. See, e.g., Schuck, supra note 93.
131. These observations are not inconsistent, I think, with the kind of pragmatic, positivistic reforms
that I recommend below. See supra text accompanying notes 114-16.
132. There has been a rapid growth of congressional staff agencies. MICHAEL J. MALBIN, UNELECTED
REPRESENTATIVES 4, 9-24 (1980) (four congressional support agencies: Library of Congress, General
Accounting Office, Office of Technology Assessment, and the Congressional Budget Office increased
significantly in both size and importance between 1945 and 1980); NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN ET AL., VITAL
STATISTICS ON CONGRESS 1989-1990 xv, 127, tables 5-1 & 5-8 (after explosive growth in the 1970s, size
of congressional staffs has stabilized in recent years). In February 1991, the Carnegie Commission on
Science, Technology and Congress released a report recommending ways to improve the means by which
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virtue. But because this value is threatened in bureaucracies, it is ultimately
enforced in the courts, where it can operate under less cultural stress. Partici-
pation and accountability, preeminent political values, are primarily the
province of Congress and the executive agencies. Still, some courts have tried
to secure them through a variety of substantive and procedural public law
doctrines. 3'
Bridging institutions. If the chasms that separate the cultures are structural
as well as normative and political, we must try to design new institutions
capable of bridging them. These institutions should expose each culture's own
blind spots, broaden its relevant knowledge base, and augment its modalities
of proof. They should acknowledge, and then seek to undermine, the smug
certitudes and parochialism that afflict all cultures: national, ethnic, or
professional.
Science bureaucrats, for example, can experiment with new ways to
incorporate political valuation techniques into ostensibly and inertially techno-
cratic agency choices. Former EPA administrator William Ruckelshaus
attempted this when he allowed industrial communities to vote on tradeoffs of
economic and environmental values before setting pollution standards. 14
Judges and lawyers should devise evidentiary procedures-putting expert
testimony in written form, for example' 35-that will make scientists more
comfortable in the hearing room or court rather than causing the best of them
to shun public forums. Courts should also adopt procedures better suited to
gathering and analyzing political and scientific information bearing on the
consequences and implementation costs of their far-reaching decisions.'36
Politicians should organize policy-making structures in order to achieve better
mixes of empirical validity, legal legitimacy, and political accountability.
Elected officials, for example, can provide technocratic regulators with more
specific decision criteria that formulate questions that science can actually
answer-questions, for example, about the number of life-years saved; the
Congress gets advice on science and technology issues. Congress Needs Higher-Quality Information to
Handle Scientific, Technological Issues, Carnegie Commission Group Says, PR NEWSWiRE, Feb. 13, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, PRNews File. In contrast, the courts have made no attempt to keep
pace with the technical resources of either the agencies or Congress. See, e.g., Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co.
v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983) ("[A] reviewing court must remember that the Commission is making
predictions within its area of expertise, at the frontiers of science. When examining this kind of determina-
tion, as opposed to simple findings of fact, a reviewing court must generally be at its most deferential.").
133. E.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1961) (alleged denial of equal protection due to state's failure
to reapportion legislative seats is justiciable constitutional claim); United States v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973) (broad citizen standing to challenge
regulatory decisions). But see, e.g., Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) (narrowing
citizen standing).
134. William Ruckelshaus, Risk in a Free Society, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. 10190, 10192-93 (1984).
135. See sources cited supra note 123.
136. For a discussion of one such approach, see PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CrTZEN
REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 188-89 (1983) (decree implementation analysis).
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number and severity of injuries avoided per dollar spent or job lost; and
regulatory risks in comparison to risks currently accepted by the public, as
revealed in their everyday choices. 37 Such an approach not only should
improve the means-ends rationality of policy decisions but should also strength-
en political control and accountability of those decisions.
These proposals are of course modest. But managing multi-cultural issues
near the peripheries has proved so difficult that considerable humility by
reformers is warranted. Only culturally eclectic reforms have a reasonable
chance of gaining the necessary political support; monocultural ones are likely
to fail. Some proposals that I have mentioned-increasing the use of written
testimony on direct examination to improve both the accuracy and intelligibility
of scientific evidence, for example-promise to strengthen scientific and legal
values without sacrificing political ones, a kind of Pareto-superior move. 131
On the other hand, most of them-including the more fundamental changes like
greater use of court-appointed experts or eliminating juries-may succeed in
advancing the values of one (or two) of the cultures only by appearing to
subordinate the values of the other(s), which is more problematic. 139
But even the most controversial reforms may be propelled forward by the
cyclical changes in the culture that move beneath the surface of normal
politics. The most important turn of this meta-cultural cycle, of course,
occurred during the New Deal when the cultures of science and bureaucratic
politics waxed at the expense of the more traditional judicial-legal culture.
Then, a growing faith in technocratic expertise converged with (and itself
encouraged) fundamental institutional reforms that supplanted much common
law adjudication and common law thinking with a system of policy-oriented,
technocratic, and electorally-sensitive administration.
The relative autonomy of this "public science," however, did not survive
the convulsions of the 1960s. A more highly politicized, legalistic society, one
increasingly suspicious of the neutrality and benignity of a science allied with
power, insisted on new political and legal controls on technocratic decision
making in public agencies and in private laboratories affected with a public
interest. Whether or not these controls have proved effective is a surpassingly
137. For recommendations along these lines, see ACKERMAN & HASSLER, supra note 83; Albert L.
Nichols & Richard Zeckhauser, OSHA after a Decade: A ime for Reason, in CASE STUDIES IN REGULA-
TION: REVOLUTION AND REFORM 203 (1981); Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas 0. McGarity, Reorienting
OSHA: Regulatory Alternatives and Legislative Reform, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 37 (1989) (calling for the
increased use of performance standards). A very limited move in this direction has been taken by the U.S.
Senate when it passed the Government Performance and Results Act, which is pending in the House.
138. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 23, at 1215-18. The pending proposed Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(a)(2)(B) will, if adopted (which appears probable) require a written report by an expert whom
a party expects to testify. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(a)(2)(B) (submitted by the Judicial Conference to the Supreme
Court, Nov. 27, 1992) (copy on file with author). Neither the proposed rule nor the commentary on it
mentions the question of this report's admissibility. id. commentary at 99-101.
139. See Gross, supra note 23, at 1208-32.
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important social question, but it is beside the present point about cultural
cycles: the time for a triumphant, hegemonic culture of public science came
and then went.
IV. CONCLUSION
Conceivably, we are on the verge of another tectonic cultural change. If
the themes of the 1992 presidential campaign are any guide, the American
public has become both skeptical about much judicial and political regulation
and optimistic about the potential social gains from market-driven, scientific
and technological innovation. Perhaps this bespeaks a new zeitgeist that will
once again exalt and institutionalize scientific values in public policymaking.
Perhaps unified Democratic Party control over the political branches (and in
time possibly the courts) will allay suspicions, which flourished during the era
of divided government in the 1970s and 1980s, that scientific values serve as
little more than pretexts and camouflages for the pursuit of narrow partisan,
bureaucratic, or ideological advantage. 1
40
But even if the time is propitious for this new consensus, it is safe to
predict that science will never enjoy the degree of autonomy that its remarkable
achievements, tantalizing promise, and methodological self-discipline 141 might
seem to have earned for it. If past is prologue, law and politics will continue
to rein in even a resurgent science despite the innovation costs, lost oppor-
tunities, and policy errors that crude controls often entail. Science will have
to make its case at the bars of public opinion and administrative law as well
as in the laboratory and the market for technology.
The public forum, however, is precisely where law and politics enjoy the
greatest tactical advantage; it is here that their cultural values, so often incom-
patible with scientific canons, tend to prevail. They alone possess the extra-
140. Although much has been made of the corrosive effects of divided government, e.g., James
Sundquist, Needed: A Political Theory for the New Era of Coalition Government in the U.S., 103 POL.
Scl. Q. 613 (1988), the truth of the matter is far more complex, as seen in the first few weeks of the
Clinton administration, during which conflicts erupted between the new Democratic President and the
Democratic chairmen of the Senate Judiciary, Armed Services, and Finance committees. See Ruth Marcus
& David S. Broder, President Takes Blame for Rushing Baird Selection; Clinton Says He Knew of Problem
Before Nomination, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 1993, at Al (Biden and Clinton clash over Baird nomination);
Michael Wines, The Gay Troop Issue: This Time, Nunn Tests A Democrat, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1993,
at I (Nunn and Clinton disagree on the issue of admitting homosexuals into the military); Mary McGrory,
Confirmation Shalalacking, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 1993, at C1 (Moynihan criticizes Clinton-nominee
Shalala's lack of emphasis on Social Security and welfare reform at her confirmation hearings); see also
DAVID R. MAYHEW, DIVIDED WE GOVERN: PARTY CONTROL, LAWMAKING, AND INVESTIGATIONS, 1946-
1990 (1991) (noting that the incidence of major legislation and investigations is unaffected by divided
government); Martin Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447 (1986) (finding that divided
government affects theories of the proper relationship among branches).
141. These scruples are neither universal nor always availing, as the incidence of scientific fraud
demonstrates. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 123, at 388-90.
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ordinary powers to conclusively choose, coerce, and legitimate social action.
Unfortunately, power, knowledge, and wisdom seldom coincide in the real
world. Law and politics, like science, offer partial, biased, and distorted
solutions to multi-cultural issues.142 Nevertheless, the values to which politics
and law appeal-legal principle, public tradition and symbolism, populist
ideology, and democratic consent-will increasingly carry the day, subordinat-
ing scientific rigor and independent inquiry to demands for political relevance
and public control.
In the epigraph to this article, Karl Menninger asserts that scientists find
the word "justice" irrelevant to most of their work. To many lawyers and
politicians, however, the notion of objective scientific truth is a parochial
conceit, sometimes useful to one's client or cause but otherwise not to be taken
too seriously. From these mutual suspicions, valuable lessons may be drawn.
Scientists must remember that it is lawyers and politicians who formulate the
public rules for our complex society. Lawyers must remember that the project
of science demands, and generally deserves, a kind of freedom to which legal
controls will often be inimical. Politicians must remember that science, which
has become the motor of this social progress,"' is to some irreducible degree
an elite enterprise that cannot flourish under the incubus of a militant populism.
Ordinary citizens must remember that the ideals of scientific advance, fair
process, and democratic legitimacy are all precious and indispensable, and
must hope that this multi-cultural competition can somehow unite them.
142. Indeed, the additional myopia engendered by their ultimate decisional power may magnify the
deficiencies of legal and political solutions.
143. For a recent decidedly negative view of this development, see BRYAN APPLEYARD, UNDERSTAND-
ING THE PRESENT: SCIENCE AND THE SOUL OF MODERN MAN (1992).
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